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The new Act on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, enacted by Parliament and effective as of 13 July 2001, defines the primary
objective of the Bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Using an inflation targeting system, the Bank
seeks to attain price stability by implementing a gradual, but firm disinflation programme over the course of several years.
In order to provide the public with a clear insight into the operation of central bank policies and enhance transparen-
cy, the Bank publishes the ‘Quarterly Report on Inflation’, covering recent and prospective developments in inflation
and evaluating the macroeconomic developments determining inflation. This publication summarises the projections
and deliberations that underlie the decisions of the Monetary Council.
The Monetary Council, the supreme decision making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, carries out a comprehensive
review of the expected development of inflation once every three months, in order to establish the monetary condi-
tions that are consistent with achieving the inflation target. The first section of the publication is the Statement of the
Monetary Council, containing its current assessment of economic perspectives and the grounds for its decisions. This
is followed by an analysis prepared by the Economics Department on the outlook for inflation and the main underly-
ing macroeconomic developments. The expected path and uncertainty of the exogenous factors used in the projection
reflect the opinion of the Monetary Council.
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STATEMENT BY THE MONETARY COUNCIL
At its meeting on 18 August 2003, the Monetary Council discussed and approved for publication the Quarterly
Report on Inflation. The Council made the following assessment of developments in inflation.
The Government has set 1 January 2008 as the target date of adopting the euro and
announced that, shortly after joining the EU, it will request Hungary’s admission into
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II).  A condition for joining the euro
is consistent implementation of a stringent convergence programme based on the
realistic assessment of the state of the economy. Any divergence from the pro-
gramme may trigger undesirable reactions from the market and an increase in the
costs of adjustment. The Bank supports the Government’s objective and, in its con-
duct of monetary policy, will endeavour to foster economic and financial integra-
tion, as well as to meet the criteria set as a condition for adopting the euro.
The preparations to be made prior to adopting the euro influence the conduct of
monetary policy in several respects. Entry into the ERM II exchange rate regime will
entail introduction of a new exchange rate band with a width of ±15%, identical
with the current system. The central parity will be defined by means of negotiations
with the finance ministers and central bank governors of the EU member countries.
With respect to successful convergence, it is crucial that the central parity equally
fosters price stability and competitiveness, in addition to being sustainable.
Therefore, it seems desirable to avoid an excessively under- or overvalued exchange
rate during the period prior to entering ERM II. Provided that the economy can suc-
cessfully follow the course set out in the Government’s Medium-term Economic
Policy Programme, the Monetary Council puts the equilibrium exchange rate which
fosters rapid economic growth without endangering price stability in the range of
250 to 260 forints per euro.
The target date of 2008 is based on the condition that in the reference period
between March 2006 and March 2007, the rate of inflation may not exceed the
average rates of inflation of the three EU member states with the lowest inflation by
more than 1.5%. Reaching this end will probably require a rate of inflation in the
range of 2.5% to 3%. The inflation target set for the reference period cannot be met
unless the fiscal, price and income policies are consistent.
Within the boundaries of the prevailing exchange rate band, the Bank continues to
rely on inflation targeting while supporting the Government’s disinflation policy.
The stability of the exchange rate, monitored  continuously by our foreign partners,
will be an important measure of the success of economic policy during the pre-and-
post-ERM II period. Provided that economic policy is co-ordinated efficiently, the
dual requirements of price and exchange rate stability will not run contrary to each
other. However, exchange rate stability should not be the immediate goal but rather
the result of monetary policy committed to the achievement of price stability.
During the first half of 2003, annual CPI growth reached a twenty-year low.
However, in the past few months, core inflation has started to edge up and the rate
of wage growth has also declined slower than previously anticipated. In the
Monetary Council’s view these developments are primarily related to excessive
growth in consumption, wages increasing out of line with productivity, and contin-
uing labour market tightness in certain areas, in addition to undesired weakening in
the exchange rate.
Prospective developments in inflation are surrounded by larger uncertainty than
usual.  This is because the measures announced by the Government on 16 July have
not received a final approval yet. Another source of uncertainty is that it is difficult
The Central Bank 
supports the
Government’s objective of
adopting the euro in 2008
Joining ERM II will influ-
ence monetary policy’s
room for manoeuvre in the
pre- and post-entry period
Rapid disinflation is a pre-
condition of adopting the
euro
Monetary policy continues
to follow the rules of infla-
tion targeting
Low inflation in the first
six months of 2003
Greater-than-usual uncer-
tainty about the inflation
outlook
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to predict how economic agents will respond to the proposed measures. The Bank
has based its projections published in the 18 August Report on Inflation on the
assumption that the budgetary measures announced by the Government will be
approved in an unchanged form.
Fiscal consolidation is indispensable in order to maintain macroeconomic equilibri-
um. The recently announced measures imply divergence from the fiscal path earlier
anticipated by the MNB, proposing to curb the budget deficit primarily by increas-
ing revenues. The measures relating to next year’s budget will affect the rate of price
increases via a number of channels. The measures to have the greatest impact in
2004 are changes in the VAT system and related excise duty measures. Assuming
an unchanged tax base, the VAT change will directly raise the price level by 1 per-
centage point. In addition, based on international experience, a further increase of
approximately 0.4 percentage points can also be expected.
In the past two years, disinflation has been considerably impeded by unsustainable
growth in domestic demand. Fiscal instruments planned to be used in order to curb
excessive demand  may mitigate the ripple effect of inflationary pressures triggered
by the one-off tax measures.  The slowdown in domestic demand growth in the
wake of the fiscal adjustment may exert disinflationary pressure in the latter half of
the year.
In the Monetary Council’s view, the most important of the risks inherent in the meas-
ures in the pipeline is that one-off measures representing upside pressure on prices
may lead to increased inflation expectations, and the economy may have a higher
wage path ahead.  
Of the factors posing upside risk to inflation, in addition to the budget, the exchange
rate of the forint has been permanently weaker than the one that the Monetary
Council deems as ideal for creating monetary conditions in favour of disinflation.
The MNB has broadened the appeal of forint investments by increasing its key pol-
icy interest rates, sending the message to investors that it would insist on support-
ing  developments in the exchange rate that were predictable and consistent with
inflation targets. As a result of such measures, consolidation in the FX market has
been slowly picking up and a gradual appreciation of the forint’s exchange rate has
also commenced. 
The Bank’s provisional projection based on the average July rate of exchange of
HUF/EUR 264 and prepared in accordance with the relevant technical rules is for
increasing inflation until mid-2004 and for declining consumer prices in the second
half of 2004. Accordingly, inflation would probably stand at approximately 5.2% and
5.8% at year-end 2003 and 2004 respectively. The inflation indicator excluding one-
off effects may be around 4.4 to 4.8% at year-end 2004. In 2005, inflation will have
to be substantially reduced. The price index is unlikely to include the one-off effects
of tax measures, but in order for the process of disinflation to continue, it is also
important that these transitory measures should not increase inflation expectations
and that domestic demand growth should remain subdued.
In the current uncertain situation, which can be characterised by the simultaneous
presence of both upside and downside risks to inflation,  the basic principle of mone-
tary policy is that the following of the long-term path of disinflation, instrumental in
fulfilling the Maastricht criteria, should be ensured. The full off-set by monetary
means of the short-term inflationary pressure from tax and regulated price-related
measures would entail excessive real economic costs. At the same time, indicators
excluding one-off effects and reflecting longer term inflation trends should not be
allowed to rise.
The proposed budgetary
measures will cause a
temporary rise in inflation
Main risks include rising
inflation expectations,
wages and a weak
exchange rate
Projection for higher
inflation
In order for the inflation cri-
teria to be met, an exchange
rate of HUF/EUR 250 to
260 must be achieved
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In the Monetary Council’s opinion, the HUF/EUR 260 exchange rate that prevailed
last week still allows upside risks to inflation too much latitude in making themselves
felt. In order that short-term risks can be reduced and that the Maastricht criteria will
bet met in 2006 and 2007, the Monetary Council recognizes the need for an
exchange rate stabilising near the stronger limit of a HUF/EUR 250 to 260. 
Due to upside risks, the MNB cannot envisage any interest rate cuts before the
exchange rate permanently stabilises near the upper limit of a HUF/EUR 250 to 260
band. An exchange rate permanently below this level may necessitate further rises in
the Bank’s key policy rate so that the rate of inflation at end-2004 remains below 5.5%.
Budapest, 18 August 2003
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
THE MONETARY COUNCIL
Fan chart of the inflation
projection*
Percentage changes on a year earlier
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* The fan chart shows the probability distribution of the outcomes
around the central projection. The entire coloured area covers 90%
of all probabilities. The central band contains the central projection
(as the mode) with a 30% probability. Outside the central projection
(centred around the mode), the bands represent 15% probability
each.
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PROJECTIONS
Summary table of projections
(Percentage changes on a year earlier unless otherwise indicated)
2001 2002 2003 2004
Actual data Projection
May Current May Current 
Report Report Report Report
CPI 
"net"1
December 6.8 4.8 4.6 5.2 3.9 5.8 4.8
Annual average 9.2 5.3 4.5 4.6 4.1 6.5 5.5
Economic growth
External demand 1.6 –0.8 3.7 3.1 – 3.9 – 4.3 4.6 3.0 – 4.6 – 6.3
Manufacturing value added 2.5 0.72 3.3 1.4 – 2.3 – 3.0 4.4 3.6 – 5.3 – 6.7
Household consumption3 5.7 10.2 6.6 6.3 – 7.6 – 8.4 5.0 0.0 – 1.0 – 3.5
Gross fixed capital formation 3.5 5.8 4.0 2.5 – 4.3 – 5.0 4.3 2.0 – 4.1 – 6.0
Domestic absorption 1.9 5.1 4.9 5.0 – 5.7 – 6.4 4.3 1.0 – 1.8 – 3.5
Exports 8.8 3.8 3.4 2.5 – 4.0 – 5.5 6.7 5.0 – 7.5 – 10.0
Imports 6.1 6.1 5.3 5.5 – 7.1 – 9.0 7.4 4.0 – 6.0 – 9.0
GDP 3.8 3.3 3.4 3.0 – 3.2 – 3.4 3.6 2.4 – 2.7 – 3.6
Current account deficit
As a percentage of GDP 3.4 4.0 5.1 5.3 – 5.8 – 6.2 5.1 4.8 – 5.2 – 5.8
EUR billions 2.0 2.8 3.9 3.9 – 4.2 – 4.4 4.2 3.7 – 4.0 – 4.5 
Fiscal stance
Demand impact 1.8 4.3 (–0.5) 0.0 – (–0.5)–(–0.9) (–1.3) (+0.3) –(–1.0)–(–1.9)
Labour market (private sector)4
Wage inflation 14.6 12.8 8.8 9.1 – 9.3 – 9.7 6.5 7.5 – 8.1 – 10.6
Employment 1.1 (–0.2) (–0.4) (–0.3) – 0.0 – 0.2 (–0.2) (–0.6) – 0.4 – 1.0
ULC based real exchange rate in manufacturing5
Annual average 7.9 11.3 1.0 (–1.0) – (–0.5)– (0.1) (–1.7) (–3.0) –(–2.6)–(–1.6)
Q4 12.9 9.8 (–3.3) (–7.5) – (–7.1)–(–6.4) (–0.7) (–0.1) – 0.3 – (1.3)
The central projection is marked in bold, surrounded by the lower and upper limits to the projection. There is a 60% probability that the value of
the variable falls within the range defined by these limits.
1 Excludes the direct, one-off effects of the planned 2004 change in the VAT and excise duties system. 
2 Adjusted series in 2002 Q3-Q4. 
3 Household consumption expenditure. 
4 Average for manufacturing and services. 
5 Positive values denote appreciation. 
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MNB forecasts versus other projections
2003 2004
CPI (December on December, %)
MNB1 5.2 5.8
Reuters survey (July 2003) 5.0 4.7
CPI (average annual growth, %)
MNB1 4.6 6.5
Consensus Economics (July 2003)2 4.7 4.4
European Commission (April 2003) 5.0 4.5
IMF (April 2003) 5.3 4.8
OECD (April 2003) 5.2 4.6
Reuters survey (July 2003) 4.7 5.1
GDP (annual growth, %)
MNB1 3.2 2.7
Consensus Economics (July 2003)2 3.0 3.5
The Economist poll (August 2003)3 2.9 3.3
European Commission (April 2003) 3.7 4.1
IMF (April 2003) 3.6 3.9
OECD (April 2003) 3.1 3.7
Reuters survey (July 2003) 3.2 3.6
Current account deficit (EUR billions)
MNB1 4.2 4.0
Consensus Economics (July 2003)2 3.8 3.8
Reuters survey (April 2003) 3.8 3.8
Current account deficit (as a percentage of GDP)
MNB1 5.8 5.2
The Economist poll (August 2003)3 5.4 5.0
European Commission (April 2003) 4.4 3.5
IMF (April 2003) 4.8 4.6
OECD (April 2003) 4.5 3.8
1 MNB forecasts are conditional on certain policy variables (forint exchange rate, interest rate, fiscal policy) and some exogenous variables 
(US dollar exchange rate, oil prices) and thus cannot be directly compared to other forecasts.
2 Consensus Economics Inc. (London). Based on a survey by ‘Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts’. The balance of payments forecasts indicated in
the survey are given in US dollars, which the MNB translated using the euro/US dollar cross exchange rate prevailing at end-2002.
3 Results of an international poll of forecasters, published in the 2 August 2003 issue of “The Economist”.

1 INFLATION

15QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
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1
In 2003 Q2, the consumer price index (CPI) stood at
3.9%, down 0.7 percentage points on the previous
quarter. Inflation in the prices of goods and services rel-
evant for monetary policy stood at 4.7%, following a
smaller decline of 0.3 percentage points.1
As projected in the May Report, the disinflation process
was interrupted during the second quarter, with infla-
tion once again gaining momentum. Previously, the
Bank projected that this development would be largely
due to an acceleration in prices of products exogenous
to monetary policy. In contrast, it was primarily endoge-
nous items that led to the higher price index in June. As
reflected in the monthly indices, core inflation has been
on a steady rise ever since February. This means that the
significant rate of disinflation seen in 2003 Q1 in
respect of goods and services relevant for the judge-
ment of the longer-term development of inflation was a
temporary trend.
At 3.9%, the CPI for 2003 Q2 is approximately 0.3 per-
centage points lower than the May projection, while
core inflation in the second quarter was the same as the
Bank’s estimate.
The difference between the overall CPI and its project-
ed rate was primarily due to the fact that, contrary to
the Bank’s expectations, seasonally adjusted prices for
unprocessed food were on a downward trend rather
than an upward trend throughout the quarter. In addi-
tion, inflation in regulated prices also fell short of the
Bank’s previous projection, as the mid-May rise in gas
prices did not pass through to consumer price inflation
in the second quarter.
While core inflation was identical with the Bank’s pro-
jection for the quarter as a whole, its development was
slightly different when viewed in a monthly breakdown.
It was suggested in the May Report that there was con-
siderable uncertainty as to whether the disinflation seen
in the first three months of the year would last. This was
1.1 PREVIOUS INFLATION PROJECTION VERSUS THE ACTUAL RATE
Chart 1-1 
CPI and core inflation 
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
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1 The July 2003 CPI figures were published after this Report was finalised. The 4.7% annual rate of CPI registered in July, and core inflation as well, show
the continuation of earlier tendencies, but suggest some new developments as well. On the one hand, the monthly rate of core inflation remains high.
On the other hand, the month-on-month acceleration of core inflation seen since February 2003 stopped in July. However, tradables inflation started
to pick up, which may be due to the weak forint exchange rate in June-July.
Table 1-1
Previous projection versus actual inflation
May Differ- Weigh-
Weight Actual projec- ence ted
(%) tion differ-
ence*
Annual Percentage
percentage points
changes
Core inflation
estimate 68.1 4.5 4.6 0.04 0.02
Unprocessed food 6.3 –2.3 0.7 2.99 0.19
Motor fuels and
market-priced
energy 6.2 3.7 3.4 –0.27 –0.02
Regulated prices 19.4 3.9 4.5 0.67 0.13
CPI 100.0 3.9 4.3 0.33 0.33
* Figures may not add up due to rounding.
because the pricing behaviour seen in the market of
goods, in line with an inflation environment lower than
previously, was not consistent with the still flat rate of
wage inflation prevailing in the private sector. At that
time it was not clear whether these pricing or wage set-
ting behaviours would change.
Data for the second quarter, however, indicate that the
pricing behaviour was temporary and the correction
may be more pronounced than expected, as the sea-
sonally adjusted monthly rate of core inflation has been
on a steady increase since February and reached a high-
er rate in June than at any time since the exchange rate
band widening in May 2001. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the acceleration seen during the previous
quarter was partly due to the April increase in the excise
duty on tobacco, an item methodologically covered by
core inflation. However, the monthly rate of core infla-
tion excluding tobacco prices has also increased since
February, but less sharply than that of original core infla-
tion, especially in June.
In addition to the aforementioned tobacco price increase,
the higher rate of core inflation was due to more rapid
increases in prices of processed foods and market servic-
es relative to 2003 Q1. Processed food price inflation
jumped to the level seen a year earlier, despite the previ-
ous quarter’s decline in seasonally adjusted unprocessed
food prices. These sharp, rapid increases in market servic-
es prices were partly due to cost-push pressure from
strong wage inflation and robust consumer demand.
The difference between the Bank’s projection for 2003 Q2
and the data was due to items exogenous to monetary pol-
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1
icy. Inflation in regulated prices fell short of the Bank’s pro-
jection by approximately 0.7 percentage point. This was
because, in contrast to the Bank’s expectations, the mid-
May rise in the price of pipeline gas will be accounted for
fully in the third quarter.
On the average of the quarter, the rise in unprocessed
food prices did not occur as expected by the Bank.
Changes in core inflation estimates with and
without tobacco (Annualised monthly changes)
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Changes in the main constituents of core 
inflation (Annualised monthly indices)
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Assumptions and forecasts of the May projection
and actual data for 2003 Q2
May projection Second-quarter
actual data
Wage inflation in the 
private sector 9.2 9.4*
Unit labour cost 3.9 5.3*
Household consumption 
expenditure 7.7 8.6*
EUR/HUF exchange rate 245.6 250.9
EUR/USD exchange rate 1.085 1.137
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 25 26.2
Imported inflation 
of tradables prices** 1.0 0.7
* Estimates.  
** Annualised month-on-month growth rates.
Table 1-2
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The Bank’s inflation projection is conditional with
respect to both monetary and fiscal policy. The assump-
tion on monetary policy is reflected by the constant
future path of the forint exchange rate fixed at its aver-
age July 2003 value of 264 forints to the euro. As
regards fiscal policy, the Bank uses the assumption that
the measures announced on 16 July and detailed in the
document on budgetary plans for 2004 will be imple-
mented.2
Since the May Report, the Bank has made a major
upward revision to its CPI projection, due to two factors
in particular. First, the devaluation of the forint’s central
parity within the exchange rate band triggered signifi-
cant depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, which,
assuming the exchange rate remains at its weak July
average, is expected to lead to an interruption in
exchange rate-based disinflation. Second, next year’s
projected changes to some indirect taxes (such as VAT
and certain excise duties), as well as a few regulatory
price measures taken this year will exert considerable
upward pressure on the CPI in 2004.
In the current projection, the CPI is 5.2% at end-2003,
and 5.8% at end-2004. This means that, based on the
assumptions underlying the projection, the central infla-
tion projection falls outside the inflation target range of
3.5 ±1% in both years.
The factors behind the high inflation projection for 2004
include one-off upward pressure on the price level of
the announced change in indirect taxation (1.4 per-
centage points), in addition to prospective macroeco-
nomic developments.
1.2 INFLATION PROJECTION
2 The 16 July announcements and the document on the Ministry of Finance website (‘Some details of the revenue and expenditure side of the budget in
2004’, see http://www.p-m.hu/home.htm), will be henceforth referred to as Budgetary Proposals for 2004 in this Report.
Table 1-3
Central projection for the CPI (Percentage changes on a year earlier)
Weights Actual Forecast
%
2003 2004
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Dec. Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Dec.
Core inflation estimate* 68.1 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.9 5.0 6.0 6.2 6.0 5.6 5.5
Unprocessed food 6.3 –0.8 –2.3 3.5 2.7 3.8 5.1 8.9 9.0 7.9 6.8
Motor fuels and market-priced energy 6.2 12.5 3.7 2.2 1.7 2.2 –1.8 2.0 –0.6 –1.1 –1.2
Regulated prices 19.4 3.0 3.9 7.0 7.3 7.3 12.4 11.3 9.3 8.6 8.6
CPI 100.0 4.6 3.9 4.8 5.1 5.2 6.7 7.1 6.4 5.9 5.8
Net CPI** 4.6 3.9 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.7 6.1 5.4 4.9 4.8
Annual average 4.6 6.5
* The estimate for core inflation is an approximation of the measure of core inflation calculated by the Central Statistical Office (CSO). 
** The direct, one-off price level effects of changes in the VAT system and excise duties, directly linked to the former, are removed from this index.
For year 2003 the net index is identical to the CPI.
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The uncertainty about the projection for 2004 is signifi-
cantly larger than previously. This is primarily due to the
increased risk linked to the forint exchange rate and the
taxation changes in 2004. In the Monetary Council’s
assessment, the Bank perceives the distribution of risks
as being almost symmetrical in other words, it is equal-
ly probable that inflation will be higher or lower than
the central projection. This is because the two main risk
factors basically cancel each other out in 2004. On the
one hand, it is more likely that the EUR/HUF exchange
rate will be consistently stronger than assumed, while
on the other hand, the impact on inflation of the taxa-
tion changes constitutes an upside risk to the inflation
projection.
In view of the figures for the quarter it seems likely that
the disinflation process seen over the past two years has
already come to a halt, simultaneously with a pick-up in
inflation, a trend not expected to reverse until the sec-
ond half of 2004. As far as the moderation in inflation
expected at end-2004 is concerned, a potential increase
in economic agents’ inflation expectations constitutes a
considerable upside risk.
1.2.1 SHORT-TERM PROJECTION
The Bank’s short-term projection for consumer price
inflation in 2003 Q3 is 4.8%, up from the low rate
(3.9%) measured in the second quarter.3 This is partly
due to the base period effect caused by a drop in
unprocessed food prices seen early last summer, and
partly to a considerable increase in regulated prices
(such as electricity).
Even though the decline in core inflation is expected
to come to a halt in the third quarter, the high rate of
consumer price inflation can be primarily attributed to
goods and services not covered by core inflation.
Accordingly, the Bank does not expect the mid-2003
depreciation of the exchange rate to exert substantial
inflationary pressure on prices included in the core
inflation index.4
1.2.2 LONG-TERM PROJECTION
The long-term projection describes the likely path of
inflation until end-2004. The forecast is based on the
assumption of a constant forint exchange rate fixed at
its average July 2003 value of 264 forints to the euro.
On the other hand, with regard to fiscal policy, the infla-
tion projection assumes the realisation of the Budgetary
Proposals announced for year 2004.
The fan chart*
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
Chart 1-4 
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3 The July 2003 CPI figures were published after finalising the forecast. The 4.7% headline rate as well as the core inflation figures were in line with the
Bank’s short-term forecast.
4 Note, however, that according to the July 2003 CPI data, the weak forint might have already had an impact on tradables inflation.
* The fan chart shows the probability distribution of the outcomes
around the central projection of CPI. The entire coloured area covers
90% of all probabilities. The central band covers 30% of the distribu-
tion, and contains the central projection (as the mode); outer bands
cover 15% probability each.
Table 1-4
Difference between the current projection and
the May 2003 projection (Difference between annual
indices, percentage points)
Absolute Share of 
difference item in CPI
(Current – May) difference
December December December December
2003 2004 2003 2004
Core inflation estimate 0.8 1.8 0.56 1.19
Unprocessed food –4.7 1.7 –0.30 0.10
Motor fuels and 
market-priced energy 3.2 –2.5 0.20 –0.16
Regulated prices 0.7 4.1 0.14 0.79
CPI 0.6 1.9 0.61 1.93
Net CPI* 0.6 0.9
* The direct inflationary effects of changes in the VAT system and excise
duties, directly linked to the former, are removed from this index.
19QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
1 INFLATION
1
The chart showing consumer price inflation in a break-
down into net price changes and the effect of taxation
reveals that, in the second half of 2003, net core infla-
tion exerts upward pressure on overall consumer price
inflation, while the contribution of non-core items is also
significantly large. During the first half of 2004, inflation
is expected to temporarily rise to over 7%, owing to fur-
ther acceleration in net core inflation and the effect of
changes in indirect taxation.5
In the second half of next year, the Bank expects a slow-
down of inflation with regard to both core and non-core
items. On the other hand, due to the effect of taxation,
the overall CPI will remain at a high rate of over 6%.
As in the previous Reports, in respect of the assumptions
underlying the central projection the exchange rate assump-
tions are constant, fixed at the average rate recorded in the
last full month (July). Accordingly, the assumption for the
forint exchange rate is 7.5% weaker than in May, while the
exchange rate of the euro against the US dollar is approxi-
mately 5% stronger. The latter assumption has a moderate
disinflationary impact at end-2003 (see Table 1-5).
Compared with the projection in May, there has been a
change in the rule applied by the Bank in the assump-
tion for the world price of oil. In addition to the constant
path fixed as the average price for the final month, the
Bank has always used a few alternative assumptions,
such as that derived from oil futures prices and consen-
sus forecasts based on the expectations of market ana-
lysts and international institutions.6 The current projec-
tion uses the oil price path constructed from the futures
prices, consistent with the practice of several foreign
central banks (including the Bank of England). Another
argument in favour of using this futures-prices-based
path is that it appears to be similar to analysts’ consen-
sus forecast (Consensus Economics).
In contrast to the constant path, the applied oil price
path predicts gradually lower oil prices, resulting in a
nearly 0.3 percentage point lower rate of inflation at
end-2004 than based on the constant path. At the same
time, compared with the assumption used in May, the
new path causes inflation to be higher at end-2003 and
lower at end-2004.
Finally, the Bank’s fiscal policy assumption is based on
schemes proposed in the Budgetary Proposals pub-
lished for 2004. The effects on inflation of potential fis-
cal policy measures different from those set out in the
proposals are covered under the risks to the projection.
Impact of a depreciated exchange rate
The over 7% depreciation of the exchange rate relative
to the assumption used in the May Report had a signif-
icant impact on the future path of inflation, exerting
most of its upward pressure on core inflation, over
which monetary policy has the greatest control. The
Bank’s calculations based on the former assumption of
Composition of effects influencing the CPI*
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
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5 In addition, the high twelve-month index is also attributable to the full-year effect of increases in regulated prices (e.g. price of electricity) in the latter
half of 2003 and the low base.
6 The path derived from futures prices is constructed on the basis of the futures transactions for Brent oil on the London-based International Petroleum
Exchange. In the current projection, the path of the futures prices is based on July 2003 transactions. The other alternative path is based on the July
survey of Consensus Economics, which calculated the consensus forecast of more than fifty market analysts and international institutions.
Alternative oil price paths
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* The chart is based on the Banks’ inflation projection. All the informa-
tion it conveys is subject to the assumptions underlying the forecast.
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exchange rate pass-through show that the weaker
exchange rate raises core inflation by approximately 1.2
percentage points and the overall CPI by 0.8 percent-
age point at end-2004.
In the core inflation projection, inflation accelerates
early in the forecast horizon and then slows down
somewhat in 2004. The decline in the pace of price
increases in 2004 is due to the projected slowdown in
the domestic demand growth rate.
As a weakening in the exchange rate affects the price of
tradables more rapidly and strongly than that of non-
traded services, via an increase in import prices in forint
terms, the inflation differential between tradables and
non-tradables prices is likely to narrow, leading to
depreciation of the so-called internal real exchange rate.
This phenomenon, reflects an interruption in the earlier
trend of exchange-rate-based disinflation, provided that
the forint exchange rate remains at its weak average
July level. While over the past eighteen months the
strong exchange rate caused the inflation differential to
increase, the Bank forecasts a reversal in this trend from
2003 Q2.
A more depreciated exchange rate may have the
longer-term inflationary pressure of becoming incorpo-
rated into economic agents’ expectations as well as
pricing and wage decisions. This effect working via
expectations further hampers disinflation. The latest
information on firms’ inflation expectations also seems
to support this reasoning. A survey conducted in July by
TÁRKI Social Research Centre found that corporate
Changes in net core inflation* 
(Seasonally adjusted and annualised quarter-on-quarter growth
rates)
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Estimated core inflation
Assumptions underlying the central projection
May 2003 Current Change
projection projection
20031 2004 20031 2004 2003 2004
EUR/HUF exchange rate (HUF) 245.6 264.02 +7.5%
EUR/USD exchange rate (cents) 108.5 113.82 +4.8%
Brent oil price (USD/barrel)3 25.0 28.1 25.3 +12.4% +1.4%
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 5653 6517 5881 +15.3% +4.0%
Imported inflation of 
tradables prices (%)4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
Wage inflation in the 
private sector (%)5 8.8 6.5 9.3 8.1 +0.5 +1.6
Nominal ULC in the 
private sector (%)5 3.5 1.9 5.1 3.9 +1.6 +2.0
Household consumption 
expenditure (%)5 6.6 5.0 7.6 1.0 +1.0 –4.0
1 For the period of time in 2003 that is included in the forecast horizon.
2 Average value for July.
3 Based on oil futures prices from IPE (International Petroleum Exchange) in July.
4 Average of annualised month-on-month growth rates. Euroarea-11 industrial goods inflation. Eurostat NewCronos code: igoodsxe.
5 Average annual growth.
Table 1-5
* The direct inflationary effects of changes in the VAT system and
excise duties, directly linked to the former, are removed from the
core inflation index.
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respondents all expected both prices and wages to
increase faster next year. Some of the impact manifest-
ed in the expectations is taken account of in the infla-
tion projection and some of it in the coverage of the
risks surrounding the central projection.
Effect of changes in indirect taxation7
The Budgetary Proposals for 2004 announces some
comprehensive changes to value added taxation with
effect from 1 January 2004, as well as some related
changes in certain kinds of excise duties (for a detailed
analysis of this subject, see Special topics).
The Bank’s projection is based on an estimate of the
expected impact of policy measures on consumer
prices. The estimated impact on inflation of the
change in indirect taxation is divided into direct and
indirect effects. The direct effect is derived by feeding
all tax changes fully into the prices. The size of this
effect on the full CPI is 1.0 percentage point.
At the same time, indirect effects have also been taken
into account, namely that the degree of the feed-
through of tax rises into prices depends on the fea-
tures of each particular product (such as the degree of
competition, price elasticity of demand and trans-
parency of prices). In addition, the calculations of the
direct effect are based on the assumption that the
feed-through of the tax measure into prices may be
asymmetrical depending on whether it involves a rise
or a reduction in taxes. Accordingly, assuming higher
downward price elasticity, a tax rise may feed through
into prices more strongly than a tax cut.
Results of the estimation carried out by the Bank indi-
cate that the change in indirect taxation, taking
account of both direct and indirect effects, will cause
a rise of 1.4 percentage points in the CPI.
It should be noted that the impact of the change in indi-
rect taxation to the real economy has also been taken
account in the inflation projection. On the other hand,
the potential second order effect that increasing infla-
tion expectations, caused by higher price indices during
the year, may trigger faster wage growth, exerting fur-
ther inflationary pressure, has not been reckoned with.
However, this effect is expected to be felt as early as
2005, with its magnitude depending essentially on the
disinflationary commitment of economic policy.
General effects of fiscal policy
The Bank’s projection for the size of the contractionary
impact of fiscal policy (–1% in 2004), based on the
Budgetary Proposals for 2004, remains virtually
unchanged from that projected in May. At the same
time, the difference is significant with regard to the
structure of the fiscal stance, as the current plans pri-
marily envisage contractionary measures that would
directly affect households.
The 2004 increase in taxes linked to consumption and
excise duties will sharply reduce household disposable
income, and consequently, consumer demand. In the
Market services and tradables price inflation 
differential (Differences between year-on-year indices)
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7 The analysis is confined here to the effect of the proposed change in the VAT system and related excise duty changes. The proposed reduction in the
excise duty on diesel and the increase in the tax on tobacco products in excess of the measure compensating for the reduction in VAT rates are not
taken into account.
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Bank’s projection annual growth in household con-
sumer demand falls from a rate of approximately 9%
measured early this year to virtually zero per cent at
end-2004. The lower demand exerts downward pres-
sure on inflation, reflected in a slight drop in the infla-
tion projection for end-2004.
Effects of labour market developments
The disinflationary period of the past two years has been
characterised by a contradictory trend, in that the adjust-
ment in the rate of wage increases has lagged behind the
decline in inflation. Furthermore, the macroeconomic
environment seen since publication of the May Report
also shows signs of a continued slowdown in this adjust-
ment. In particular, a pick-up in economic activity and the
increase in inflation expectations from exchange rate
depreciation causes wage inflation to exceed the project-
ed rates in both years (9.3% in 2003 and 8.1% in 2004).
Despite the higher wage inflation projection, the Bank
still assumes that growth in real wages will return to a
path consistent with productivity growth, reflecting the
adjustment of wage inflation to more moderate con-
sumer price inflation. Accordingly, the Bank expects
wage inflation to continue to moderate gradually over
the forecast horizon.
Other goods and services
The projection for unprocessed food prices is for a
broadly constant inflation profile until mid-2004, caus-
ing the annual price index to be over 9% in mid-2004,
due to the low base. From 2004 Q2, the Bank expects
price increases to moderate, thanks to sharper compe-
tition arising from the termination of existing customs
duties on imports following EU accession.
Since the publication of the May Report, the motor fuel
and market-priced energy projection has been revised
up for end-2003 and down for end-2004. This could be
primarily attributed to the assumed path of the world oil
price, which, in forint terms, is more than 15% higher in
the second half of 2003 than in the May projection and
declines gradually over the forecast horizon.
While with regard to petrol, the cut in VAT rates sched-
uled for 2004 is offset by the rise in excise duty, with
regard to diesel, also in the group of motor fuels, the
Budgetary Proposals for 2004 prescribe a cut in excise
duties. The proposed 2.4 forint per litre cut will reduce
the CPI in December 2004 to an extent of only 0.05
percentage point.
The increase in the excise duty on tobacco exceeds the
rate offsetting the cut in the VAT rate. In the projection,
the rise in excise duties reaches a total of 17.6% for this
group of products in January 2004, in line with the pro-
visions of the Budgetary Proposals. This is essentially
consistent with a linear path for excise duties, which can
bring the rate to the EU requirement (of 64 euros/1,000
cigarettes) by January 2009.
There have been several revisions to the projection for
regulated prices relative to the May Report. First, as
opposed to the previous forecast, the May rise in the
price of pipeline gas has been reported in the July CPI
data. Second, two further price increases are scheduled
for August (electricity prices will be raised by 9% and
postal services by 6.8%), raising inflation with regard to
prices in this category relative to the projection in May.
The Bank has no official, detailed information regarding
the price regulatory measures to be taken in 2004. With
respect to regulated items, where no other published
information is available, the Bank uses the previously
applied technical assumption that (net) prices will rise
on average at the rate of non-tradables, that is, by 7.7%
(annual average index) in 2004. For some prices, we
assume, based on past patterns (e.g. telecommunica-
tions) and 2003 measures (e.g. electricity) that prices
would be increased at a lower rate. Overall, the average
net rate of price increases of the regulated group is pro-
jected to be 5.8% on average in 2004.
Net unprocessed food price inflation (Seasonally
adjusted and annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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In the Monetary Council’s assessment, the risks to the
central projection are balanced at the end of both
years. This is because the probability of a disinflationary
movement in the forint exchange rate balances the
upside inflationary risk in the wage forecast and that of
the impact of tax changes on inflation.
At the same time, uncertainty (the variance of the dis-
tribution) is 25% higher in 2004 than at the time of the
previous projections.
The risk factors in both years comprise private sector
wage inflation, changes in world oil prices and price regu-
lation, constituting an upside risk to inflation, as well as the
forint exchange rate, representing a downside risk to the
central projection.
Additional risk factors will appear in 2004, due to the
changes in taxation and its implications announced in the
2004 Budgetary Proposals. Even though the risks to the
exchange rate of the forint and the impact of the expect-
ed decline in household consumer demand growth are
downside risks in 2004, they will be offset by the upside
risks.
The following section outlines three alternative scenar-
ios, depicting prospective developments in both infla-
tion and the real economy. First, the uncertainty relating
to the personal income tax table for 2004 is examined,
second, the effect of the forint exchange rate being
stronger than the Bank’s assumption, and third the risk
involved in private sector wage inflation differing from
the central projection.
Uncertainty surrounding the personal income tax
table
Uncertainty surrounding the personal income tax table is
divided into three key components. An upside risk to
inflation is that it is not definite yet whether the tax table
announced in the Budgetary Proposals will be adopted
in 2004, as assumed in the Bank’s central projection, or
the tax table set out under current law. Should the tax
table be as it is in the current law, in contrast to the
Bank’s assumption, household disposable income might
grow faster than indicated in the central projection,
which may dampen the decline in household consumer
demand growth in 2004. This may cause GDP to grow
by nearly one percentage point faster than projected, as
well as a slightly higher rate of inflation in 2004.
Second, even if the tax table outlined in the Budgetary
Proposals is adopted, there will be significant upside risk
Main factors of uncertainty in 2004
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1.3 UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING THE CENTRAL PROJECTION
Table 1-6
Bounds of the bands in the fan chart 
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
Lower Lower Lower Cent- Upper Upper Upper
90% 60% 30% ral 30% 60% 90% 
path
(mode)
2003 Q3 3.6 4.2 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.8
2003 Q4 3.4 4.2 4.7 5.1 5.4 5.8 6.6
2004 Q1 4.5 5.6 6.2 6.7 7.2 7.7 8.7
2004 Q2 4.7 5.9 6.5 7.1 7.6 8.2 9.3
2004 Q3 3.7 5.0 5.7 6.4 7.0 7.7 9.0
2004 Q4 2.9 4.4 5.2 5.9 6.6 7.4 8.8
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to inflation associated with the impact of the measure
on household consumer demand. The central projec-
tion is based on the assumption that households
respond to the decline in disposable income primarily
by curbing consumption. On the other hand, it is also
possible that households make adjustments by cutting
back more sharply on savings, which may cause a 1-2
percentage point rise in the projected growth rate of
consumer demand in 2004. Here, GDP growth may
amount to 3.5% as an average for 2004, while the CPI
may be approximately 0.2 percentage point higher at
the year-end.
Third, there is also great uncertainty about the disinfla-
tionary effect of the projected slowdown in household
consumer demand growth. Against the background of
robust growth in consumer demand in 2002 and 2003,
the slowdown projected for 2004 is substantial, indeed
unprecedented, in the history of the Hungarian econo-
my since the early 1990s. As based on statistical esti-
mates, the central projection is for a relatively moderate
disinflation profile, the above factor constitutes major
downside risk to the inflation projection. If the expect-
ed decline in consumer demand is assumed to exert
stronger disinflationary pressure than proposed in the
central projection it will lead to an inflation projection
lower by a few tenth of percentage points at end-2004.
Uncertainty about the exchange rate of the forint
A significant downside risk to the inflation projection is
the outlook for the EUR/HUF exchange rate. The cen-
tral projection was based on the assumption that the
exchange rate of the forint will remain constant over
the full forecast horizon at the very weak rate prevail-
ing in July 2003 (EUR/HUF 264). The central inflation
projection suggests that a forint exchange rate stronger
than its assumed value is desirable for inflation to
approach the inflation target. Therefore, the alternative
scenario of an exchange rate gradually strengthening
over the forecast horizon should be considered.
Assuming that the exchange rate appreciates to
EUR/HUF 250 by end-2004 at a smooth pace, this may
lower inflation at end-2003 slightly and by over 0.5 per-
centage point in December 2004. At the same time,
the stronger exchange rate will worsen corporate com-
petitiveness over the short term and, mainly through its
impact on the current account, and reduce the GDP
projection. At the same time, the deterioration in cor-
porate sector profitability may stimulate a decline in
wage inflation and slow down the upward trend in the
level of employment seen since early 2003.
Uncertainty about wage inflation in the private
sector
The Bank perceives an upside risk to private sector wage
inflation over the full forecast horizon, basically due to
two factors. First, the weak exchange rate may further
slow down the adjustment of the rate of wage increases
to the existing moderate inflation environment.
A second source of uncertainty is the upward pressure
of inflation expectations on wage inflation, not taken
account of in the current central projection. The latter,
so-called secondary effect may arise as the one-off
upward pressure of the change in indirect taxation in
2004 on the price level may be perceived by econom-
ic agents as an acceleration in inflation, causing them to
adjust their wage increase decisions to a higher expect-
ed rate of inflation.
Faster wage increases will impair competitiveness by
increasing firms’ labour costs, which may in turn ham-
per the recovery in employment and production pro-
jected for 2004. On the other hand, it may raise house-
hold income, stimulating faster growth in consumer
demand. Finally, the increase in the income tax base will
cause fiscal revenues to increase as well, improving the
position of general government in 2004.
At the upper limit of the wage inflation projection for
the private sector, a rate of wage growth 0.4 and 2.5
percentage points faster in 2003 and 2004 respectively
may raise the inflation projection by 0.2 percentage
point at end-2003 and 0.6 percentage point at end-
2004. The Bank estimates that, on the whole, this would
exert upward pressure on GDP and consumption in
2004. GDP could grow at a roughly 0.5 per cent high-
er rate next year. The effects on the labour market and
competitiveness would appear only later.
2 ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
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The real economy forecast is founded on the assumption
that the exchange rate is fixed for the whole forecast hori-
zon in terms of the average rates for July 2003 (264
HUF/EUR), representing a 7% depreciation of the ex-
change rate relative to the assumption in the May Report.
The Bank’s fiscal policy assumption is based on measures
of the 2004 Budgetary Proposals published in July.
The Bank has revised down its forecast for economic
growth to 3.2% in 2003 and 2.7% in 2004, relative to
the earlier forecast. The downward revision to the earli-
er forecast for 2004 is mainly due to the planned fiscal
consolidation, different in structure relative to the earli-
er assumption, which will likely have a negative influ-
ence on the expected rate of economic growth. The
explanation for this is that the measures envisaged in
next year's fiscal policy proposals will likely retard
household consumption growth, although its effects will
also be reflected in a decline in household investment.
In 2003 Q1, Hungarian economic growth slowed dra-
matically and was lower than estimated in the Bank's May
Report. Based on first-quarter actual data, the Hungarian
economic cycle is assumed to have been at its trough in
the period, but signs of an expected pick-up have since
appeared. Available data for Q2 appear to reinforce the
Bank's assumption that manufacturing has perhaps passed
the bottom of its cyclical slowdown.
The Bank's view of external economic developments
has remained unchanged since the May Report. Data
on external demand appear to underline the opinion
that, although the recovery has already started, consid-
erable uncertainties still remain.
In respect of fiscal consolidation this year, the Bank's
expectation has remained unchanged relative to the pre-
vious Report. By contrast, owing to the fiscal consolida-
tion measures announced by the Government in the fis-
cal policy proposals for 2004, consolidation will likely be
slightly more modest, though substantially different in
terms of structure, compared with the May forecast. In
contrast with the earlier assumption, fiscal consolidation
will mainly affect households, which, in turn, will slow
down economic growth directly, through declines in
household consumption and fixed investment.
Major uncertainties remain in the labour market. Based
on actual data for the first quarter, the Bank assumes the
private sector to have shown signs of a slight adjust-
ment in wage-setting behaviour, which, however, is not
reflected in the April–May data. Despite continued dis-
inflation, wage inflation in the manufacturing sector
began to increase slightly in the second quarter. In the
market services sector, wage inflation has continued to
grow in recent months, after stalling at high levels due
to robust domestic demand and persistently high infla-
tion expectations.
Although the latest labour market data on the private
sector appear to reinforce the Bank's expectation of an
improvement in economic performance, uncertainties
still remain. The rise in unemployment may have ended
in the period, but the household confidence index con-
tinued to fall. This leads to the assumption that the cur-
rently strong growth in household consumption will
likely weaken further in the coming months. The current
forecast for nominal wages in the private sector in 2004
is higher than in the May Report, but this implies much
more modest wage growth, due to the changed infla-
tion path and the dampening effects on real wage
growth of the Government's proposed tax measures.
Consequently, the rate of household consumption is
likely to fall strongly in 2004.
The Bank's forecast for whole-economy fixed invest-
ment has changed little relative to the previous
Report, and continues to reflect the different paths of
the external business cycle and domestic fiscal poli-
cy. The current forecast points to a pick-up in corpo-
rate fixed investment, closely aligned with the recov-
ery of external demand, as experienced in the first
quarter. Although fixed investment growth in the
services sector is estimated to be slightly lower in
2004, due to the decline in domestic demand, this
will likely be counterbalanced by a pick-up in manu-
facturing fixed investment activity. The growth of
household sector fixed investment is expected to
slow in 2003, after growing robustly in the previous
year, and may even slip into negative territory in
2004, due to the restrictive measures called for by
fiscal policy. The Bank expects the growth of public
sector fixed investment to fall this year and to remain
2.1 DEMAND
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stable in 2004, in line with the fiscal adjustment pro-
gramme.
The Bank has revised up its forecast for whole-econo-
my exports. This mainly reflects the actual first-quarter
data and, to a lesser extent, the weaker exchange rate
taken as an assumption. Import growth has been
stronger than export growth since 2002 H2. The Bank
expects this trend to remain uninterrupted in 2003. The
rising import content of household consumption and
the pick-up in corporate fixed investment provide an
explanation for the growth in whole-economy imports.
In the Bank's forecast for 2004, exports expand more
robustly than imports, due to the expected recovery in
external demand and a slowdown in household con-
sumption.
The Bank's evaluation of the current phase of the eco-
nomic cycle has also been reinforced by its first experi-
mental analysis of developments in potential output
(potential GDP) and the output gap.8 Potential GDP
shows the trend of output. The difference between
actual and potential GDP, also known as the output
gap, shows whether the economy is above or below its
long-term growth path.
In 2002, the output gap fell to around zero, as a result
of the opposing effects of the decline in external eco-
nomic activity and an expansionary fiscal policy. The
output gap was at around zero in 2003 Q1. It indicates
GDP fluctuating around its long-term trend and does
not necessarily mean that inflationary pressures have
abated, as this does not take into account the different
structure of economic growth in which below-potential
output was registered, accompanied by a strong pick-
up in household demand.
The Bank has also estimated the output gap for the fore-
cast period. Based on the results of the estimation, the
output gap is expected to turn positive in 2003 H2, as
an effect of the expected recovery in external demand.
In the Bank's current forecast, a significantly negative
output gap is expected next year, resulting from a con-
siderable decline in household demand. In addition,
domestic demand is likely to fall and actual GDP to
drop below its potential as a consequence of fiscal con-
Output gap*
* Output gap: percentage difference of actual and potential GDP.
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(Annual percentage changes)
Weights 2001 2002 2003 2004
%**
Estimates Forecast
Corporate sector 57 1.0 (–2.3) 2–6 3–7
General government 19 (–6.9) 21.7 3–10 5–10
Households 24 21.4 18 0–5 (–5)–0
Whole-economy 
fixed investment 100 3.2 5.8 2.5–5.0 2.0–6.0
* These investment data may differ from the figures for gross fixed
capital formation, see Manual to Hungarian Economic Statistics.
** Government spending on motorway construction is included in 
general government data.
Table 2-1
Table 2-2
GDP growth and its components
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
Actual Forecast
2001 2002 2003 2004
Household consumption 5.3 8.8 6.8 0.6
Household final cons. expenditure 5.7 10.2 7.6 1.0
Social transfers in kind 3.8 3.0 3.0 –1.0
Public consumption 4.9 1.5 2.0 1.5
Gross fixed capital formation 3.5 5.8 4.3 4.1
‘Final domestic sales’* 4.8 7.3 5.7 1.5
Domestic absorption 1.9 5.1 5.7 1.8
Exports 8.8 3.8 4.0 7.5
Imports 6.1 6.1 7.1 6.0
GDP 3.8 3.3 3.2 2.7
* Final domestic sales = household consumption + public consumption
+ gross fixed capital formation.
8 For more details, see the Special topics section of the Report. 
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solidation. Apart from other factors, the negative output
gap would lead to declining inflationary pressure; how-
ever, other factors also affect developments in inflation.
2.1.1 EXTERNAL DEMAND
In the Report, the Bank uses the weighted average of
imports, at constant prices, of Hungary's major trading
partners, as the main gauge of developments in external
demand. The weights accounted for by the countries in
the indicator are determined by the shares of the coun-
tries within Hungarian exports. In the analysis, reference
will be made to the indicator as a gauge of the size of
Hungary's export markets, in order to distinguish it
more markedly from other indicators of external busi-
ness activity.
According to the Bank's current forecast, the size of
Hungary's external markets will only change marginally
on the forecast horizon of end-2004 relative to the ear-
lier forecast, although there may be slight deviations
over the short term (2003 H2).
External economic activity, particularly in Western
Europe, remained subdued in 2003 Q1, and available
data for the April–May period suggest that a significant
acceleration of performance failed to commence in Q2.
This is underlined by GDP and industrial output data,
and industrial confidence indices from Hungary's major
trading partner countries. However, the size of
Hungary's export markets indicates dynamic growth
since 2002 Q2. A significant difference between the
dynamics of GDP, industrial output and other coinci-
dent and leading indicators, on the one hand, and
imports, on the other, for 1–2 quarters, cannot be seen
as extraordinary. However, this gap has lasted for four
consecutive quarters, making it difficult to forecast
external demand over the short term. In fact, it is the
German data that are practically the sole cause for this
phenomenon, making the evaluation slightly easier.
In the previous Report, the Bank expected modest
growth in imports of Hungary's major trading partners
in 2003 Q1. Data confirmed this expectation, except
in the case of Germany. German imports rose at a rate
of nearly 2% during the period, despite the country's
declining GDP. Consequently, short-term growth in
external demand turned out to be significantly higher
than the Bank's forecast for three consecutive quar-
ters.
As, based on the Bank's current expectation, a per-
ceptible recovery in external business conditions is
only likely to begin around the end of this year or early
2004, imports of Hungary's major trading partners are
assumed to rise only modestly in 2003 Q2, then to
pick up slightly, though tentatively, in the second half
of the year.
However, the factors defining the medium-term path of
external demand have changed little. Consequently,
import growth registered by Hungary's major trading
partners in 2004 may be roughly equal to the forecast
in the previous Report.
Of the major international economic forecasters, the
OECD, the IMF and the European Commission have
not yet updated their April forecast; consequently the
Bank's projection for external demand in 2003 contin-
ues to be one of the lowest and contains the lowest
increase in 2004, compared with other projections.
Comparison of German imports and other 
indicators of external economic activity
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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In the Bank's view, there is a risk that external
demand will grow slightly below the central path in
2003, due to the indicators depicting a somewhat
less favourable picture of external economic activity.
In 2004, the direction will likely turn around the Bank
anticipates a much lower growth rate in the central
path than international organisations and market
research institutes. Consequently, the balance of risks
is on the upside.
2.1.2 FISCAL STANCE
The Bank has estimated the fiscal stance on the basis of the
Budget and Taxation Acts, and approved government pol-
icy measures for 2003, as well as the published budgetary
proposals for 2004.9 In the Bank's current forecast, the con-
tractionary impact of general government on demand may
be approximately 0.5% of GDP in 2003 and approximate-
ly 1.0% in 2004, indicating a somewhat lower contrac-
tionary impact relative to the forecast in the previous
Report.10
In 2003, a contraction of demand is likely to materialise in
a structure in which items affecting household income rise
at a rate in excess of economic growth, due to pre-deter-
mined revenues and expenditures. Contraction of demand
will occur through spending cuts in the rest of the items,
for example, fixed investment.
The Bank's May forecast assumed that this structure would
be maintained in 2004 as well. However, based on the
budgetary proposals announced by the Government in
July, a completely different picture has emerged. The cen-
tral projection is based on the assumption that fiscal policy
will implement the measures set forth in the budgetary pro-
posals. In that case, contraction of demand would involve
the items affecting household income and consumption
(direct and indirect taxes), while fixed investment would
increase.
Estimating the 2003 fiscal demand impact
The basis for the Bank's 2003 estimate is that, in respect
of the fields where the Government's measures are
expected to have a full impact, the Bank only takes into
account information available in legal instruments or, in
exceptional cases, other pieces of information available
in draft proposals.
In addition, in fields where there is no full central gov-
ernment control over the developments, the Bank pre-
pares its own forecast. Accordingly, the Bank forecasts
developments in tax revenue and expenditure on old-
age pensions on the basis of its own macroeconomic
projections and the estimated effects of government
measures, while it forecasts autonomous fiscal develop-
ments, such as the behaviour of local authorities and
budgetary units, and uses of open-ended subsidies, on
the basis of observable trends.
A number of the risks indicated in the central projection
in the May Report are likely to materialise this year. The
Government has decided to reform the open-ended
subsidy systems (–0.1%) and freeze some spending
items (–0.2%). These effects are broadly comparable
with the Bank's earlier assumption.
In addition, the Bank has also taken into account a gov-
ernment measure already announced but not yet legis-
lated, according to which the deadlines for the pay-
ments of 13th month wages would change, slightly
9 Fiscal targets and measures for 2004 were announced on 16 July. A more detailed version was published on the website of the Ministry of Finance
(see http://www.p-m.hu/home.htm).
10 It is the fiscal demand effect that matters from the perspective of short-term developments in inflation, economic growth and external balance, which
the Bank estimates using the annual change in the corrected SNA primary balance of general government, introduced in 1998 for analytical purpos-
es. For methodological issues, see Manual to Hungarian Economics Statistics.
Forecasts for the growth of Hungary's export
market size*
2003 2004
Current Previous Current Previous
MNB 3.9 3.7 4.6 4.6
European 
Commission 3.9 5.9 6.4 7.1
OECD 4.1 5.5 6.8 7.6
IMF 4.4 5.7 6.3 N/A
* Weighted annual average of import growth of Hungary's 12 main
trading partners in per cent (constant prices). Sources: European
Commission: Economic Forecasts (April 2003/November 2002);
OECD: Economic Outlook (April 2003/November 2002); IMF:
World Economic Outlook (April 2003/October 2002).
Table 2-3
Table 2-4
Fiscal demand impact 
(As a per cent of GDP)
2002 2003 2004
Preliminary Central projection
Direct demand impact* 4.3 –0.5 –1.0
* Change in corrected SNA primary balance adjusted for the effect of
pension reform. The (+) sign denotes fiscal expansion of demand,
and the (–) sign denotes contraction. For more details, see Manual
to Hungarian Economic Statistics.
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reducing the 2003 and 2004 deficits. In addition, the
Supreme Court has ruled that certain child-care bene-
fits must be paid. Relying on the official release of the
National Motorway Company, the Bank has revised
down its estimate for government road construction.
However, taking the Government's decisions as a
basis, the Bank has revised up its forecast for quasi-fis-
cal items by 0.2% of GDP, in relation to the loans and
state guarantees granted to agriculture and loss-making
companies.
Updating the macroeconomic forecast for 2003 would
have resulted in a 0.3% higher tax revenue as a pro-
portion of GDP (PIT, social security contributions, VAT).
However, the Bank has chosen to revise down its fore-
cast for tax revenue by 0.2%, due to actual revenue
data for the second quarter of 2003. Explanation for this
is that tax revenue lagged far behind the assumptions
based on actual macroeconomic developments, such
as the increasing tax base, for instance.
If the shortfall in tax revenue proves to be a lasting phe-
nomenon, then the projection will have to be revised
down further. This will also be reflected among the risks
to the central projection for 2003 which also includes
the uncertainties surrounding the expenditure of local
authorities and budgetary units, given that a major part
of this is concentrated in the last quarter.
Estimating the 2004 fiscal demand impact
Given the high level of uncertainty surrounding fiscal
policy for 2004, the Bank has prepared two different fis-
cal forecasts based on different principles. The
Government and Parliament may make significant
changes during the period between its proposed meas-
ures announced in July and the adoption of the Budget
Act towards the end of this year. As a benchmark or
extreme value of the possible forecasts, a rule-based ver-
sion is presented. Its principles, in harmony with the
OECD's practice, imply that all proposed measures not
yet legislated are excluded from the forecast. (This
method is discussed in detail in the Special topics sec-
tion of the Report.) On the other hand, we calculated
the usual expert baseline scenario based on the pro-
posed fiscal measures announced by the Government in
mid-July. The difference between the results of the two
forecasts expresses in numerical terms the size of
announced but not yet legislated government measures,
and also the risks of postponing their implementation.
Based on the expert central projection which uses the fis-
cal proposals as a starting point, the expected contrac-
tionary impact may amount to 1.0% of GDP in 2004. The
rule-based projection, prepared for the purposes of com-
parison, does not reflect the proposed measures. Instead,
it starts from the observable trends of earlier years, pre-
Table 2-5
Current estimates for the 2003 fiscal demand impact relative to the May Report (As a per cent of GDP)
Previous central projection: –0.5
Additional child-care benefits (due to lawsuits) +0.2 Higher tax revenue –0.1
Pharmaceutical and housing subsidies +0.1 Expenditure cuts –0.3
Quasi-fiscal subsidies +0.2 Delays in road construction –0.1
Expansionary effect +0.5 Contractionary impact –0.5
Current central projection: –0.5
Risks in the central projection for the 2003 demand impact (As a per cent of GDP)
Central projection: –0.5% demand impact
Higher contraction of demand Lower contraction of demand
Higher tax payment at the end of the year –0.1 Lower tax revenue +0.2
Slowdown in broadly defined government fixed investment –0.1
Delays in expenditure by local authorities and budgetary units –0.2 Additional expenditure by local authorities and budgetary units +0.3
Total difference under extreme scenario –0.4 Total difference under extreme scenario +0.5
Demand impact under extreme scenario –0.9 Demand impact under extreme scenario 0.0
Table 2-6
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determined revenues and expenditures and measures
already adopted in law (for example, the reduction in
income tax for 2004). The resulting 0.8% expansionary
impact shows what would be the demand impact of fis-
cal policy in absence of the proposed measures. Thus,
the effects of the measures in the budgetary proposal of
July will presumably amount to 1.8% of GDP.
The Bank's 2004 forecast in the May Report was based on
projecting the behaviour of the central government based
on our past experience, in addition to partial information
available at that time (on legal instruments and pre-deter-
mined revenues and expenditures). Since then, the budg-
etary proposals adopted by the Government in July, have
been announced, together with a number of details, in
addition to the major aggregates. Based on these, the
Bank has prepared an expert central projection, using its
own forecasts for macroeconomic developments and esti-
mates for autonomous fiscal developments.
The budgetary proposals suggest that expenditure
would rise as a proportion of GDP in 2004, and the
increase in revenue would be higher than the increase
in expenditure. However, after eliminating the effect of
payments to EU, expenditure would fall slightly as a pro-
portion of GDP. Accordingly, the proposed tax increases
do not provide cover for additional expenditure, but
only reduce the deficit.
In contrast with the May assumption, the budgetary
proposals do not include measures to reduce fixed
investment activity. Instead, the central budget takes
back a part of tax reductions implemented in 2002-
2003. Tax revenue would increase through increases
partly in direct taxes (taxes on labour income) and part-
ly in indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties).
The 1% increase in the social security contribution rate
would affect all levels of income. By contrast, the pro-
posed measures affecting labour PIT (taxes on pension
contributions, higher tax brackets and restrictions on
other allowances) would affect low income categories
less, due to compensation through tax credits.
Although the planned changes to VAT and excise
duties contain certain reductions in rates, on balance
they will boost revenue. A large part of these measures
will affect household consumption and consumer
prices. Another measure (its effect being 0.1% of GDP)
will cease tax deductibility of certain government sub-
sidies, which, in turn will reduce the value of these cor-
porate subsidies.
Apart from payments to the EU, expenditure as a pro-
portion of GDP will fall slightly. All this can be imple-
mented with a significant degree of restructuring, as a
number of additional expenditure items will occur
which the Government will only be able to cover by
curbing allocations to other areas. EU subsidies, which
will require co-financing by the central budget, and the
necessary institutional development will cause auto-
matic additional expenditure. The budgetary proposals
will offset this to a great degree by reducing the esti-
mation basis for certain items of expenditure (0.7% of
GDP). As a combined effect of pre-determined expen-
ditures11 and priorities12 the proposals envisage only a
small increase, or even a nominal reduction, in some
of the other expenditure items. All in all, wages and
household transfers will grow at a somewhat slower
rate than GDP and infrastructure investment will ex-
pand at a faster rate.
The central projection differs from the announced budget-
ary proposals in three points:
– Based on its macroeconomic forecast, the Bank expects
tax revenues to be lower and pension indexation to be
higher than set out in the proposals.
– Based on trends of autonomous fiscal develop-
ments, local authorities are expected to continue to
run a deficit.
– Measures not presented in detail (for instance ‘improve-
ment in the efficiency of tax collection’) have been
ignored.
There are also other risks to the central projections. First,
macroeconomic developments constitute an upside risk
to the projected demand contraction. Faster growth in
the main tax bases (such as salaries, consumer spending)
would entail higher revenues and slightly higher pension
expenditure. Provided that the tax bases increase at the
11 The full-year effect of this year's wage increases and widows' pension, the payment of another one-week amount of 13th month pensions and Hungary's
NATO commitments.
12 Infrastructure projects, certain welfare measures, next year's wages increases.
Results of the different forecasts for the 2004
demand impact (As a per cent of GDP)
MNB forecasts for 2004
Rules-based Expert central Difference in 
forecast projection percentage
points
(= expected 
measures 
based on 
proposals)
Demand impact +0.8 –1.0 –1.8
Table 2-7
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projected rate and inflation is higher, the pension expen-
diture would increase due to the indexation.
In addition to the expected macroeconomic develop-
ments, 2004 revenues will be determined this year's tax
base, and whether the shortfall in tax revenue in H1
proves to be lasting or temporary.
The major restructuring planned on the expenditure
side carries the risk that the proposed reduction in
expenditure will not actually occur. This may happen in
such a manner that local government authorities and
budgetary units use their own funds, and that certain
items are spent outside general government. Additional
expenditure, as noted above, carries especially impor-
tant risks, as the Bank's central projection does not con-
tain any increased uses of carry-forwards in the budget
and assumes a reduction in local government deficit.
Finally, the central projection is based on the proposed
measures, some of which are uncertain, particularly with
regard to the withdrawal of changes in the personal
income tax (PIT) table. Hence, there is also a fiscal policy
risk among the uncertainties surrounding the projections.
Accordingly, if the Government foregoes the proposed
PIT measures announced in July, revenues from personal
income taxes would be lower by 0.7% of GDP com-
pared to the level set out in the budgetary proposals. It is
an unanswered question as to whether this would be off-
set by other measures at the level of the approved official
deficit, probably not affecting households.
– First, it is possible that the contractionary stance
would not change in size but only in structure as a
result. As the indirect effect of the previously
approved PIT table, the Swiss indexation method
(based on net wages) would lead to higher expendi-
ture on pensions. Simultaneously, the fact that higher
household income would generate higher consump-
tion would have an impact of a similar size on tax rev-
enues. The loss in PIT revenue would presumably be
offset in the case of investment projects and corpo-
rate transfer payments.
– Second, it is also possible that the aforementioned sav-
ing on expenditure would be implemented only par-
tially. This is because the saving may be partially offset
by autonomous fiscal developments, or quasi-fiscal
items, not included in the official deficit, may decrease
less strongly. As a combined effect of these factors, the
balance of risks to the central projection for the con-
tractionary stance appears to be on the downside. 
Within the demand impact, the items directly affecting
household disposable income and developments in gov-
ernment fixed investment as part of whole-economy
fixed investment are dealt with separately in this section.
The Bank has revised down its forecast for general gov-
ernment sector wages in 2003 and 2004 relative to the
previous Report. This revision reflects the release of the
CSO's data report for May and the Government's fiscal
policy proposals announced for 2004. The Bank has
revised up its forecast for the annual increase in
employed persons in 2003 by 0.2 percentage point to
1%, and has reduced down its forecast for the average
wage increase from 18.6% to 17.7%.
The increase in wages in 2003 continues to be shaped by
the full-year effect of public servants' wage increases, an
increase in civil servants' wages, effective from July, and the
increase in judges' and prosecutors' wages implemented in
Table 2-8
Risks in the central projection for the 2004 demand impact (As a per cent of GDP)
Central projection: –1.0% demand impact
Higher contraction of demand Lower contraction of demand
Macroeconomic developments –0.3 Macroeconomic developments +0.1
Smaller offsetting effect of fiscal developments Higher offsetting effect of fiscal developments 
(local government, institutions) –0.1 (local government, institutions) +0.6
2003. temporary effect of tax shortfall in H1 –0.2 2003. lasting effect of tax shortfall in H1 +0.2
Greater reduction in quasi-fiscal items –0.1 Lower reduction in quasi-fiscal items +0.4
Deficit-reducing measure which The approved and not the proposed PIT table 
is not covered by the central projection –0.7 is implemented +0.7
Maximum total risk* –0.9 Maximum total risk* +1.3
Demand impact under extreme scenario –1.9 Demand impact under extreme scenario +0.3
* These risks cannot be summed up, as they are not independent of each other.
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two stages. Explanation for the more modest decrease rel-
ative to the previous Report is the payment of a 13th month
bonus salary to civil servants, partially postponed to 2004,
as included in the fiscal policy proposals for 2004.
Following a decline in the previous years, the number of
persons employed in general government increased by
1.5% in 2002. This increase gained momentum in
September, and employment in December was 4.4%
higher than in the same period of the previous year.
Presumably, this increase was the effect of rises in
wages of public servants in education and health care,
although there were significant increases in public
administration as well. Up to end-May, the rate of
increase in employment barely dropped (3.7%).
The Bank's forecast for 2004 public sector wages reflects
a 1% reduction in employment on the basis of the 2004
budgetary proposals and a total HUF 119 billion wage
bill on the basis of the partial data published in the budg-
etary proposals. According to the proposals, this amount
provides cover for the full-year effect of wage increases
in 2003 as well as the 5% increase in wages of public
servants and employees of defence and public order.
Accordingly, the Bank forecasts general government
gross wages to increase by around 8% in 2004.
Transfers to households in cash will likely increase by
9.5% in nominal terms in 2003, up some 1.1 percent-
age points on the forecast in the previous Report. This
revision has been necessitated by that fact that supple-
mentary benefits to people receiving child-care benefits
in previous years will be paid out on the basis of a court
ruling. The nominal growth expected in 2004 is 7.8%,
comprising a pension rise calculated using the Bank’s
own macroeconomic forecasts and a one-week pay-
ment of the 13th month pension, as well as family
allowances preserving the real value of money. 
The volume of broadly defined government fixed invest-
ment is expected to increase by 5% in 2003 on the
basis of the CSO's national account statistics. Whereas
spending on general government fixed investment will
fall temporarily, this will hardly be reflected in the accru-
als-based accounts. By contrast, general government
spending on fixed investment will resume rising in 2004.
This, however, will only have a moderate effect on the
CSO's fixed investment statistics for the year. The
expected increase in fixed investment volume on an
accrual basis is likely to be around 8% in 2004.
2.1.3 HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION, SAVINGS
AND FIXED INVESTMENT
Compared to the projection in the Report in May 2003,
the Bank’s current projection for household behaviour
is substantially different. While, owing to a higher-than-
expected wage inflation and a slower-than-expected
rate of saving, the projection for 2003 consumption
expenditure has been revised upwards, a significantly
lower rate of increase in consumption expenditure is
forecast for 2004. The principal underlying reason for
this is that, in the Bank’s estimation, inflation will be
higher, with the proposed fiscal tightening directly
affecting households. Simultaneous regulatory changes
concerning subsidised housing loans and negative real
income prospects will also hit household fixed invest-
ment adversely in 2004.
What makes the expected household behaviour difficult
to study is that as of yet no similarly major, abrupt
switches from an expansionary to a tightening fiscal pol-
icy have been experienced in the household sector.
While 2002 was the year of record incomes and soar-
ing consumption with spillovers to developments in
2003, judging from the disclosed fiscal proposals for
2004, fiscal policy will be highly restrictive in the house-
hold sector in 2004. In addition, households’ real
income will be further tapped by higher-than-expected
inflation, as according to the Bank’s estimation CPI infla-
tion will be higher than the rate of increase in the house-
holds’ disposable income.
Household income and consumption expenditure
(Annualised growth rates, per cent)
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Table 2-9
Household consumption, savings and fixed
investment (Annualised growth rates, per cent)
Real net Real Real fixed
household consumption investment 
income expenditure expenditure
2002 Fact/Estimates 12.4 10.2 20–30
2003 7.7 7.6 0–5
Projections
2004 (–1.6) 1.0 (–5)–0
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The Bank’s indicators also underline the uncertainty about
the future. New vehicles sales further increased in 2003
Q1, while retail turnover and the consumer confidence
index fell in Q2.13 A GKI consumer survey reveals that
households’ perception of the country’s future and of their
own is bleaker than in Q1. All things considered, the Bank
projects the continuation of a slower but still dynamic
increase in consumption expenditure for 2003 Q2.
The Bank’s projection for the entire 2003 calendar year
is also affected by the above divergent factors. On the
one hand, factual data show higher-than-projected
income and consumption in Q1. On the other, wage
adjustment to disinflation was slower than projected in
the Bank’s previous Report. Another factor that increased
income was the court ruling on the payment of sup-
plementary childcare benefits. Given such factors, real
consumption expenditure is expected to grow by 7.6%
in 2003.
The perception of the developments envisaged for
2004 is considerably different than projected in the
May Report. Basically, three significant shocks will influ-
ence household behaviour and lower household
income: the forint depreciation, changes in indirect
taxes (e.g. VAT rates, reclassification of VAT rates and
excise duties) and personal income tax.
The forint depreciation in mid-2003 and the assumed
average July forint exchange rate is likely to exert
upward pressure on inflation in 2004. The proposed
indirect tax changes imply a one-off rise in the price
level in 2004. The effect of the former on wages was
taken into account in terms of an increased wage infla-
tion forecast for 2004. However, the potential second
order effects of the indirect tax changes on wages and
prices were only considered as upside risk to the base-
line wage and price inflation projection. As a result,
although the Bank’s wage projection was also revised
upwards, this will still not prevent households’ gross
(pre-tax) real income from growing at a slower rate in
2004 than projected in the May Report.
The announced direct tax (personal income tax (PIT)
and social security contributions) changes for 2004
imply that net (after-tax) real income levels will decline
in 2004. Fiscal policy for 2004 as at the compilation of
the May Report was expected to be expansionary in the
household sector owing to the legislated PIT cuts. The
fiscal plans announced in July include fiscal tightening
measures that will drain household income in 2004. In
the Bank’s estimation, such direct tax changes will entail
a 3.5% decrease in the proportion of net wages relative
to gross wages. A modest rise in wages will be con-
comitant with an equally modest increase in pecuniary
social benefits (e.g. pensions, childcare benefits, etc.).
Although, overall, while households’ gross real income
is expected to grow by roughly 2% in 2004, house-
holds’ net real income may well shrink by 1.6 % as a
result of the announced changes in direct taxes.
The question is to what extent households will adjust to
the anticipated decrease in real income following a
robust expansion in real wages and consumption in
2002 and 2003. The Bank’s assumption is that in mak-
ing decisions on consumption expenditure, households
will allow for their earlier habit formation, i.e. they will
only gradually be willing to reign in the high consump-
tion that they have become accustomed to. Accordingly,
consumption expenditure is expected to take some
Growth rate of retail turnover 
(Annualised growth rates, per cent)
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time to adjust to developments in real income. Based
on the above, consumption is likely to grow by 1% in
2004, reflecting higher willingness to consume and fur-
ther disinterest in saving.
Another pivotal issue to bear in mind when households
are studied is housing loans and related changes in
housing fixed investment and fixed investment expendi-
ture. The vigorous expansion of subsidised housing
loans has greatly contributed to the fact that household
net lending was negative in Q1 and that no marked
increase was experienced in this respect in Q2 either. It
remains a moot question whether such vigorous expan-
sion was fuelled by a sudden rush for loans owing to the
introduction of stricter eligibility criteria for and credit
limits on subsidised housing loans in June or by credit
demand that is here to stay for any length of time.14
The abolition of tax relief due on housing loans put for-
ward as a proposal in the Budgetary Proposals may also
reduce demand. Costlier housing loans and bleak real
income prospects are likely to combine to dampen
households’ housing investment willingness. It seems to
be safe to assume that, based on the foregoing, house-
holds’ fixed investment expenditure will grow more
modestly in 2004 than projected in the Bank’s previous
Report.15
The uncertainty of projections for consumption expen-
diture is rather asymmetric in 2003 and will remain so
in 2004 as well. Such asymmetry is caused by the man-
ner in which households react to the conflict between
an expansionary and a restrictive fiscal policy. If, with a
view to the adjustment measures to take effect from
2004, households cut back consumption as early as this
year, consumption in 2003 may turn out to be lower
than projected.
Since the fiscal tightening announced in July has not yet
been codified in legislation, it may still change, and thus
it can be assumed that the Government’s adjustment
package will take a less heavy toll on households. This,
in turn, may provide for the possibility of higher con-
sumption in 2004. For example, if the announced PIT
tightening was not to be implemented in 2004, house-
holds' real income would not decline and consumption
expenditures in real terms would grow by 2.5 percent
in 2004.
2.1.4 CORPORATE INVESTMENT
Corporate investment grew more than expected in the
first quarter, substantiating the Bank’s assumption that
accelerating business activity is also beneficial to cor-
porate investment decisions. Thus, the Bank projects
steadily expanding corporate investment in the future.
As expansion in the first quarter was, however, signifi-
cantly higher than what can be attributed to the busi-
ness cycle, the Bank assumes that the short-term uncer-
tainty of its projection has grown.
The Bank’s perception of external demand, one of the
factors affecting long-term developments in fixed
investment, has remained basically unchanged over
the past quarter. At the same time, however, improv-
ing corporate competitiveness is expected to produce
better sales figures in 2004. Consequently, the Bank
projects vigorous fixed investment activity relative to
its earlier projection. The reason that long-term pro-
jections are uncertain is that expectations for the
global business cycle remain subdued, which may, in
turn, jeopardise a lasting recovery in the domestic
economy.
Manufacturing fixed investment grew considerably in
the first quarter, amounting to 4.4% growth on a year
earlier. This has corroborated the Bank’s assumption
that manufacturing fixed investment passed through the
trough of the business cycle in Q2 2002 and that it is
likely to pick up again in 2003.
Growth, a considerable portion of which cannot be
accounted for by business cycle-related factors, was,
however, much faster than expected. Although there
are an increasing number of signs indicating recovery in
the domestic business cycle (see the sections on
Output and on Inventory investment), neither sales out-
look nor business confidence has improved to an extent
that could account for the expansion of manufacturing
fixed investment in the first quarter. Therefore, in the
Bank’s opinion, such a conspicuous expansion must
have been generated by individual factors and may
undergo minor correction during the rest of the year.
14 Major changes in eligibility criteria for and credit limits on subsidised housing loans that affect borrowers are that the ceiling of subsidised loans for
housing-related purposes has been lowered from HUF 30 to 15 million and that the interest rate due on such loans has risen to 6%.
15 Data for 2003 H1 residential investment was released after finalising the Report. The number of building permits rose, implying a pick-up in housing
investment activity. This may, however, be linked to the announced tightening of eligibility criteria and credit limits. Overall, the growth of residential
investment slowed in H1. This increases the downside risk to the household investment projection.
Table 2-10
Projected corporate investment 
(Annual growth rates, in per cent)
Actual Projection
2002 2003 2004
Manufacturing investment (–9.2) 3.3 6.5
Corporate investment (–2.3) 3.8 5.3
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Due to the ‘noisiness’ of Q1 data, short-term develop-
ments in manufacturing investment are rather hard to
assess. The results of a Kopint survey on corporate busi-
ness activity in the second quarter point to a continuing
recovery in fixed investment. Capacity utilisation
increased substantially in the first quarter, reaching its
historical 79% level for the first time since mid-2001.16
The ratio of companies that view their capacity as
unable to match their anticipated orders also grew.
These indicators, therefore, suggest diminishing produc-
tion capacity and a take-off in the business cycle.
Business confidence, however, remains subdued, which
may hamper a rapid take-off in manufacturing invest-
ment. According to the Kopint survey, the expectations
of manufacturing companies hardly improved in Q2.
The majority deemed export and sales outlook as more
favourable and output prospects less favourable than in
early 2003. Multinational companies, which were not
included in the survey, primarily allow for Western
European, rather than Hungarian prospects for the busi-
ness cycle, which seem to continue to be bleak. The
issue of when a slow recovery in the business cycle will
start to boost corporate confidence is key to a perma-
nent upswing in corporate investment.
External demand, real exchange rates and corporate
profitability combine to affect manufacturing invest-
ment in the long term. The Bank’s perception of exter-
nal demand has barely changed over the past quarter,
and its projection calls for modest, steady expansion
(see the section on External demand). The unit labour
cost-based real exchange rate depreciated by over 6%
in the period under review, owing to the shift in the
band of the central parity and the weakening of the
forint, assuming the July exchange rate to remain con-
stant over the forecast horizon. However, according to
the Bank’s expectations this depreciation will improve
corporate competitiveness only in the short run, up until
2004, even with the technical assumption of keeping
the nominal exchange rate at the current level. With a
weak exchange rate, accelerated cost inflation and a
higher effective cost of euro-denominated debt would
all lead to the restoration of the previous, stronger real
exchange rate and lower competitiveness.
On the other hand a further continuous, albeit slow
adjustment is expected on the labour market, which
by improving labour side profitability is also likely to
encourage fixed investment. Based on the above fac-
tors, manufacturing fixed investment is expected to
grow by 3.3% and 6.5% in 2003 and 2004, respec-
tively.
Corporate investment exceeded manufacturing invest-
ment in 2003 Q1, which can be attributed to the strong
dynamics of investment in market services. In the
Bank’s view, the growth rate of investment in market
services will be the same in 2003. In 2004, however, its
growth dynamic will be more modest. Although, due to
the simultaneity of the impacts of domestic and global
business activity, market services are difficult to model,
and no unequivocal link between the investment and
consumer demand can be identified. Overall, output
and investment in this sector are expected to slow
down in 2004 as a result of dwindling domestic
demand. Accordingly, the Bank assumes that corporate
investment will exceed manufacturing investment in
2003 and then fall behind 2004, growing by 3.8% and
5.5% in 2003 and 2004, respectively.
Sectoral composition of corporate investment 
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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2.1.5 INVENTORY INVESTMENT
The Bank's inventory indicators showed the first signs of
a nascent upward phase in the business cycle in 2003
Q1. Although the Bank’s previous Report covered the
increase in whole-economy inventories, it attributed
such increase to strong domestic demand rather than to
an upswing in business activity, owing to the fact that
the level of manufacturing stocks remained unchanged.
Available data on Q1 have, however, led the Bank to
revise its perception of the past situation. Recent data
show that manufacturing stock levels have been rising
steadily since mid-2002, suggesting that the inventory
cycle may have recovered from its lows approximately
9 months ago.
As the growth rate of manufacturing output slowed in
the first quarter, it is hard to say at first to what extent
sales problems or a brighter outlook for a pick-up in the
business cycle are responsible for rising manufacturing
stocks. A closer look at manufacturing stocks reveals
that expansion in Q1 was attributable roughly in equal
measure to increased input stocks and stocks of fin-
ished goods. Based on this, it is safe to assume that an
improved perception of the business cycle also con-
tributed to rising manufacturing stocks.
In the Bank’s view, unchanging levels of stocks of goods
in trade point to a further upswing in domestic demand,
which is substantiated by a vigorous retail turnover in
H1 and highly dynamic consumption in Q1. It is equal-
ly possible, however, that, deteriorating consumer con-
fidence dampened trading companies’ expectations of
future sales, cautioning such companies to show
restraint in increasing their stocks. Due to the high
volatility of data on stocks, it will be possible to sub-
stantiate the latter alternative conclusion only when fur-
ther detailed data are available.
2.1.6 EXTERNAL TRADE
Growth in imports and exports is likely to be seen in
2003, whereas 2004 is expected to be the year of
increasing exports and decelerating imports. With
exports growing faster than imports next year, the pro-
jection is in line with the assumed drop in consumer
demand due to the fiscal tightening.
Available current data suggest that the volume of goods
exports grew in 2003 Q1 and will continue to do so in
Q2. This might seem to be in contrast with the foreign
trade data published by the Central Statistical Office in
euros at current prices, that shows a decreasing value of
goods exports. For proper conjunctural assessment,
however, export data must undergo several corrections.
The most influential of those is the exclusion of the ”X-
box effect”, that, as a result of a one-off location/relo-
cation decision, significantly raised foreign trade figures
at the beginning of the last year, but may not have rel-
evance on longer-term developments. Taking into
account all these corrections, goods exports exhibit a
slight increase even at current prices, and the growth
rate is even stronger once one deals with data at con-
stant prices.
The same holds true in the case of goods imports, with
the exception that imports exhibit a positive growth rate
even without corrections. But with these corrections
implemented, the growth rate is even stronger.
Contributions to growth in the whole-economy
stock level
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter contributions to growth)
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Growing goods export seems to be fully consistent with
developments in external demand and industrial export
sales. Over the medium term, the path of external
demand is expected to remain unchanged. Forint
depreciation is only likely to encourage companies’
export sales slightly, as changes in the real exchange
rate are blunter than those in the nominal exchange
rate, exerting their effects with a time lag. Dynamic
expansion in early 2003 is likely to generate a consid-
erably higher annual growth rate in goods exports rela-
tive to the Bank’s forecast in May. Accordingly, the
annual growth rate is expected to exceed earlier pro-
jections in 2004 despite roughly unchanging dynamics.
Based on available data, services exports, projected as
very dynamic in the previous Report because of the
2002 basis, will be much weaker, which mainly reflects
developments in tourism revenues. The Bank assumed
that following a plunge in 2002, tourism revenues
would recover as early as 2003. Data on the past peri-
od, however, point to a further downturn, which cannot
be offset even by more impressive revenues in other
services. Although tourism revenues, too, are expected
to rise in 2004, revenues of services as a whole are like-
ly to fall slightly below those of goods exports.
As a result, the Bank’s projections are for a 4% and
7.5% rise in whole-economy exports in 2003 and 2004,
respectively, reflecting an optimistic perception relative
to its earlier assessment of the global market opportu-
nities of domestic enterprises.
Similar to goods exports, goods imports also grew faster
in 2003 Q1 than expected in May. Given the current
business cycle, the growth rate of goods imports can be
considered especially high, attributable to increased
investment activity on the part of the corporate sector
(and within this, developments in inventory investment,
see Section 2.1.4 and 2.1.5) and a stronger-than-expect-
ed expansion of external demand in early 2003. The
forint depreciation in mid-2003 as well as the fiscal
measures aimed at curbing consumer demand mainly in
2004 are likely to slow the dynamics of goods imports
considerably over the medium term.
The Bank’s projection is for continuing slow growth of
services imports over the projection horizon, which
will – owing to increasingly sluggish domestic
demand – further reduce the growth rate of whole-
economy imports in 2004. Data, now to be treated as
facts, suggest that whole-economy imports will grow by
7.1% and 6% in 2003 and 2004, respectively, the for-
mer markedly higher and the latter markedly lower than
the Bank’s previous projections.
These developments also point to improving net exports
after a pronounced deterioration of the trade balance in
2003, which means that, with domestic demand signifi-
cantly slowing down, exports may resume their role as
the engine of economic growth in 2004.
2.1.7 EXTERNAL BALANCE
The Bank has revised its estimate of the current account
deficit for 2003 upwards to EUR 4.2 billion (5.8% of
GDP), relative to the previous Report. The Bank expects
the external financing requirement to fall in 2004. Due
to the methodology concerning EU transfers, the cur-
rent account deficit is still projected to amount to EUR
4.0 billion (5.2% of GDP), roughly converging with the
Bank’s projection from May.
Consistent with the projections in the May Report, the
general government borrowing requirement has declined
Goods exports and imports at current prices
(Corrected time series, in EUR)
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in 2003. Private sector lending has decreased to a larger-
than-projected extent, generating an increase in the exter-
nal financial requirement. Data for the first six months of
the year indicate that households have taken an unprece-
dented net borrowing position. In addition to high house-
hold consumption in H1, the amount of outstanding
housing loans also grew dynamically. Neither household
consumption nor the amount of housing loans is expect-
ed to accelerate in H2. Thus, looking at the entire year,
households are expected to take a positive net saving
position, albeit lower than last year. Corporate sector
lending is also shrinking, as its accumulation, following
last year’s low levels, is increasing this year.
The external financing requirement as a proportion of
GDP is expected to decline somewhat in 2004. The
Bank assumes that the general government borrowing
requirement will decline as a result of fiscal tightening
aimed at contracting demand. The planned fiscal measures
will also tap households’ disposable income. The Bank
projects a slight increase in household net savings as a
result of reduced consumption. Although, consistent
with the global business cycle, corporate sector accumu-
lation is expected to continue to grow, it is projected to
remain in a net lending position.
EU accession will have a neutral effect in terms of the
external financial requirement. The Bank estimates that,
compared to last year, the settlement of EU transfers
and customs duties, different from the Hungarian sys-
tem of settlement, will be offset by Hungary’s overall
contributions. EU-related settlement will, however,
increase the current account deficit by approximately
0.4% of GDP, since Hungary’s contributions will be
Table 2-11
Current account deficit and financing capacity of
sectors (As a per cent of GDP)
2001 2002 2003 2004
Estimate Projection
I. General government* (–5.0) (–9.1) (–8.0) (–6.4)
II. Private sector (1+2) 2.2 5.4 2.3 2.0
1. Households 5.1 2.4 0.4 0.9
2. Corporate sector** (–2.9) 3.0 1.9 1.1
External financing 
requirement (I+II)*** (–2.8) (–3.7) (–5.7) (–4.4)
Current account 
balance (–3.4) (–4.0) (–5.8) (–5.2)
in EUR billions (–2.0) (–2.8) (–4.2) (–4.0)
* Specially constructed cash flow indicator to analyse net saving
positions, which are different from the general government
balance.
** Financial and non-financial corporations combined. Government
spending on motorway construction is included in data on the
general government sector. Companies that are otherwise included
in the government sector when the effects of fiscal demand are
analysed fall into this category.
*** The external financing requirement includes the current and 
capital account balances.
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In respect of conditions determining developments in
output, external demand, the real exchange rate and
consumer demand have undergone changes that, com-
pared to the Bank’s May prognosis, affect the current
projection. Changes in external demand only influence
the timeline of output dynamics, leaving the paths of
gross output and value added on the same level in the
medium term. Modification in the projection for com-
petitiveness and consumer demand on the Bank’s pro-
jection horizon will have tangible albeit conflicting
effects in 2003 and 2004.
Due to the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate
in mid-2003 and the assumed July 2003 exchange rate
for the whole forecast horizon, manufacturing unit
labour cost-based real exchange rate has depreciated
more than previously projected. If the nominal
exchange rate of the forint remains at the July level,
manufacturing may be able to experience some extra
transitory expansion, albeit quite small. However, such
expansion will, over the longer run, be restricted by
inflation through nominal depreciation, costlier imports,
the increased burden of foreign exchange credit and
the fact that, owing to the announced fiscal measures,
consumer demand will be lower than expected. Such
measures will also reduce the growth rate of value
added in market services significantly, which will be
reflected mainly in the 2004 figures. The construction
industry is already slowing down and is likely to do so
next year as well.
Since the turning point, which relying on the informa-
tion available the Bank believes came at year-end 2001,
manufacturing output has started growing. Actually,
output started increasing a quarter of a year earlier than
in Germany which is deemed as a benchmark indicator.
The Bank continues to tentatively assert that this mainly
reflects stronger activity by Hungarian companies (sub-
sidiaries of foreign companies), the major exports of
which are goods for fixed investment purposes. The rea-
son for such a tentative assumption is that turnover in
this type of goods will pick up most rapidly at the out-
set of an upturn in the business cycle. Nevertheless,
there is some uncertainty about the stability and expect-
ed rate of growth, since, similar to major European con-
fidence indexes, Hungarian indicators have also been
eroding since 2002 H2, with gross manufacturing out-
put declining from quarter to quarter. This spilled over
to 2003 Q1; however, the data available for April and
May point to another take-off in manufacturing output.17
Similar developments can be observed in manufactur-
ing productivity, the growth rate of which also began
rising at year-end 2001 after a period of lengthy slug-
gishness. Growth, however, continues to be subdued.
Manufacturing output is basically external demand-driv-
en, as due to the high import content of exports and
investments and FX-denominated debts, over the short
run the profitability of export companies is only slightly
influenced by depreciation. The projection for output
attaches rather more significance to slight changes in
the path of external demand. No matter how uncertain
the short-term projection is (due to conflicting views on
short-term developments in external demand), over the
medium run, manufacturing output may stabilise along
the former path. Accordingly, gross manufacturing out-
put is expected to stand at 3.4% and 6.6% in 2003 and
2004, respectively.
2.2 OUTPUT
17 Just before finalising this Report, the Central Statistical Office published the preliminary data on industrial production for June. Although the Report
only contains forecasts on manufacturing production, the figure for industrial production reinforces the Bank’s view of accelerating manufacturing in
the second quarter.
Table 2-12
Output (Average annual growth rate, in per cent)
Fact Projection
2002 2003 2004
Gross manufacturing output 3.6 3.4 6.6
Manufacturing value added* 0.7 2.3 5.3
Value added in market services 4.1 3.9 3.5
Value added in construction industry 10.0 6.1 4.0
* Corrected time series.
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Nearly the same is true for manufacturing value added,
with the exception that relevant data for this item reflect-
ed a large increase at year-end 2002 and a small increase
in early 2003, neither of which can be reconciled with
output, exports or employment figures. As a result, based
on what was included in the Bank’s previous Report, data
on 2002 Q3 and Q4 have been corrected using the time
series of gross output. The Bank’s current projection is for
manufacturing value added to increase by 2.3% and
5.3% in 2003 and 2004, respectively. The revision of data
series has also contributed to such marked changes com-
pared to the Bank’s earlier projections.
Strong consumer demand continued to generate high
value added in market services in 2002. The fledgling
upswing in the business cycle is expected to be sup-
ported by an increase in transport services in both
2003 and 2004, but an even more important impact
will be exerted by the inflation windfall from the depre-
ciation of the forint and fiscal measures-induced con-
tracting consumer demand in 2004. Both of these fac-
tors are bound to precipitate a major contraction in
commercial services which have been expanding
recently. Therefore, the Bank projects that, overall,
value added in market services will expand less quick-
ly from 2003 H2 than earlier projected and this figure
is expected to stand at 3.9% and 3.5% in 2003 and
2004, respectively.
Following a slowdown in 2002 Q4, value added in
construction continued to dwindle in 2003 Q1, main-
ly attributable to unfavourable weather conditions.
The growth rate of both the building construction, also
representing the infrastructure development of the
Government, and housing construction has plummet-
ed. While the former is expected to pick up gradually
over the medium term, the latter seems to have suf-
fered an unusual setback in 2003 Q1, but is likely to
gather considerable momentum during the rest of the
year. However, 2004 is very likely to witness much
more modest growth. As far as construction of other
buildings is concerned, with government investment
reaching increasingly massive proportions now that
mid-election time is approaching, it is projected to
take off slowly over the entire projection horizon. The
Bank currently projects that value added in construc-
tion will increase by 6.1% and 4% in 2003 and 2004,
respectively.
Manufacturing output and value added*
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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3 LABOUR MARKET AND COMPETITIVENESS

The announced 2004 increases in indirect taxation may
have an impact on wage growth. If employees and
employers take the one-off price level increases stem-
ming from changes in indirect taxation as inflationary
developments, then their inflation expectations would
increase, implying a higher rate of wage growth for the
following years. This potential, second order effect of
the changes in indirect taxation is, however, not part of
the Bank’s baseline scenario and is treated as a major
upside risk factor.
In the assessment of developments in the labour mar-
ket, the Bank continues to focus on the adjustment of
wages to disinflation. As pointed out in several previ-
ous Reports, wage inflation substantially higher than
productivity growth poses significant threat, because
if wages are not flexible in adjusting to the lower
inflation path, enterprises have no choice but to
increase prices or layoff staff in response to the rela-
tive increase in the price of labour. The implications
of inconsistent wage policy are inflationary pressure
in the former scenario and a decline in production in
the latter.
Nevertheless, data on 2003 Q2 clearly show that, in
contrast to the Bank’s previous assumption, there was
no considerable adjustment in wages even in manufac-
turing, where the need to adjust was strongest due to
sharp international competition. Despite steady disinfla-
tion, short-term manufacturing nominal wage indices
remained virtually flat in 2003 Q1, starting even to edge
up in the second quarter. The picture is similar with
regard to market services, where wage inflation, which
was already stuck at a high level early in the year due to
buoyant domestic demand, has been further increasing
over the past few months.
In addition to the significant difference between the
latest data and the previous projection, another factor
calling for a revision to the projection is the change in
the estimates for the state of the business cycle. There
are signs of a recovery, such as an increase in average
hours worked, in line with production, investment and
inventory data in the area of manufacturing. The Bank
assumes that firms respond as slowly and with as little
flexibility to the one-off depreciation in the real
exchange rate arising from the depreciation of the
forint exchange rate as during the previous disinfla-
tionary period.
Indeed, the central projection is for a significantly
slower, prolonged nominal adjustment in the labour
market than previously thought. In view of the
changes in economic activity, the projection for wage
inflation within the private sector as a whole has been
revised up from 8.8% to 9.3% in 2003 and from 6.5%
top 8.1% on 2004.
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Table 3-1
Summary table of labour market indicators 
(Percentage changes on a year earlier*)
MNB Projection MNB Projection
estimate estimate
May Report Current Report
2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004
Manufacturing
Employment* (–1.9) (–1.8) (–0.6) (–1.9) (–1.9) (–0.1)
Wage inflation* 11.8 7.5 5.4 11.6 8.2 7.3
ULC** 7.6 0.9 –0.1 7.2 2.9 1.7
Market services
Employment* 1.6 1.0 0.1 1.5 1.8 0.9
Wage inflation* 13.7 9.9 7.4 13.5 10.3 8.8
ULC** 9.3 6.0 3.6 9.1 7.3 5.8
Private sector
Employment* (–0.2) (–0.4) (–0.2) (–0.2) 0.0 0.4
Wage inflation* 12.8 8.8 6.5 12.6 9.3 8.1
ULC** 8.2 3.5 1.9 8.0 5.1 3.9
* MNB estimates based on data reported by the Central Statistical
Office (see Manual to Hungarian Economic Statistics).
** ULC denotes nominal increases in labour costs per unit of value
added.
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The latest data indicate that employment in both sec-
tors appears to be following the previous trend, that is
employment has been declining steadily for a long time
with regard to manufacturing and increasing at a slow-
ing rate with regard to services. Based on the Bank’s
assessment of the state of economic activity, the pro-
jection is for a declining profile in manufacturing
employment until early 2004, to be followed by an
upturn. Numbers employed in services increase at an
ever slower rate this year and the first half of next year,
before flattening out in 2004 Q3.
In 2003 Q1, the growth rate of unit labour costs within
the private sector continued to decline as expected.
This was because while labour costs rose at the previ-
ous rate, productivity improved substantially, especially
in manufacturing.
The Bank expects the growth rate of unit labour costs to
fall gradually in the future, due to slower wage inflation
and higher productivity. The projection for unit labour
cost growth within the private sector is 5.1% in 2003 and
3.9% in 2004. As the inflation projection for the forth-
coming period exceeds the current projection, labour side
profitability of companies is expected to improve at a
steady pace both in 2003 and 2004.
Due to the weakening in the nominal exchange rate in
June, and with the technical assumption that the July
exchange rate of the forint remains stable, manufactur-
ing companies’ competitiveness based on unit labour
costs will improve by approximately 7%, in terms of a
one-off change. Because of the acceleration of inflation,
price-based competitiveness only improves by 2% this
year and deteriorates by roughly 5% in 2004.
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Labour market indicators suggest on the whole a rever-
sal of previous trends and a pick-up in labour demand
with a more intensive utilisation of the labour pool.
While the information available at the time of the May
Report contained no evidence of a reversal in the busi-
ness cycle, the latest statistics on labour usage intensity
expressed in terms of average hours worked by manual
workers in manufacturing indicate a recovery.
Consistent with changes in external demand and man-
ufacturing production, data reported in April and May
indicate a turning point in the trend in early 2003, with
average hours worked in manufacturing beginning to
increase again in the second quarter, following a long
break.18 Nevertheless, the changes in economic activity
have not affected all the sectors identically. The
increase in average hours worked in manufacturing
was most pronounced in the chemical industry, base
metal manufacturing and metal processing, as well as
the food industry and, to a lesser extent, the textiles
industry. In other sectors, the average hours worked
remained flat or declined, even in machinery where
labour usage has started to increase earlier.
Labour demand in the private sector changed broadly
in line with the Bank’s expectations in the reference
period. On the whole, employment did not change sig-
nificantly in level, and reallocation between manufac-
turing and market services continued at the same pace
as in the previous quarter.
The steady decline in numbers employed in manufac-
turing since end-2000 and the simultaneous down-
ward trend in total hours worked continued in 2003
Q2. The numbers employed in manufacturing have
only diverged considerably from the previous trend in
the wood and paper industry, with an upsurge instead
of stagnation since the start of the year. The textiles
and clothing industry continue to record a rapid rate
of layoffs, while the other industries have experienced
no major change in numbers employed in the recent
period.
The future demand for labour in manufacturing can be
influenced by a number of economic changes affect-
ing the sector both directly and indirectly. The first
such change that should be noted is the ongoing cycli-
cal recovery within the sector. However, firms tend to
respond to a pick-up in activity by endeavouring to
make more efficient and intensive use of existing
labour rather than by increasing the number of staff.
The Bank expects the acceleration in manufacturing
output growth to have a palpable impact on labour
demand only at end-2003 and early 2004, while the
factor assumed to have a more pronounced impact on
employment over the next few months is the slower
expansion in the external market.
Another upward revision to the previous projection aris-
es from the temporary effect on general economic
activity of the one-off depreciation in the real exchange
3.1 LABOUR USAGE
Average weekly hours worked by manual 
workers in manufacturing*
Chart 3-1
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18 Actual data reported by the CSO available up to May; June data are estimated using statistical methods.
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rate caused by the depreciation of the forint exchange
rate in mid-2003.
Based on the above information, the projection is for a
continued decline in manufacturing employment until
end-2003 and a pick-up from 2004.
Over the past few years, market services were charac-
terised by buoyant growth in numbers employed,
which has started to taper off gradually, in accordance
with the Bank’s expectations. However, on the basis of
the latest information, the Bank does not expect
growth to come to a halt, in contrast to the assump-
tion in the May Report. In line with the expectation of
a steady decline in consumer demand, the numbers
employed in the sector are projected to increase at a
decelerating rate this year and in the first half of next
year, and become flat from 2004 Q3. 
Changes in and forecasting of full-time 
employment*
Chart 3-2
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Unemployed persons are the primary source of labour
market reserves for an expanding economy. Following
a decline of several years, both the number of unem-
ployed and the ratio of such to the economically active
population has been steadily increasing since early
2002.19 However, the latest data provided by the CSO
reflect an interruption in this growth. The number of
unemployed people registered at the Employment
Office has followed a similar trend.
Even though the latest unemployment rate of 6.0% in
2003 Q2 does not appear high by international stan-
dards, the participation rate for the working age popu-
lation is low, suggesting a low level of available labour
reserves.
Since early 2002, the number of collective redundan-
cies reported has increased significantly. As noted in the
May Report, the rise in announced dismissals is proba-
bly due to a delayed effect of the slowdown in global
economic activity and partly to labour costs growing at
a faster pace than productivity. However, data for the
second quarter reflect a slowdown if not a reversal in
this trend. It should be noted that assuming usually low
values, this indicator is very sensitive to individual
announcements. The decline in registered vacancies
seen ever since early 2000 also seems to have come to
a halt in Q2.
Although the only data for Q2 is little information to
come to the conclusion that the trend has reversed, all
signs indicate that there is an interruption in the loos-
ening of labour market tightness observed so far. In
view of the expected developments in the level of
employment and the economically active population
and in contrast with the projections of the May Report,
growth in unemployment is expected to come to a halt
in 2003 and turn down in 2004.
Changes in the rates of unemployment, inactivity
and employment*
Chart 3-3
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Changes in registered 
unemployment
Chart 3-4 
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3.2 LABOUR MARKET RESERVES AND TIGHTNESS
19 Based on the CSO Labour Force Survey.
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At the same time, certain sectors and regions may expe-
rience labour market bottlenecks, which may also affect
wage inflation.
Announced mass redundancies*
Chart 3-5
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Reported unfilled vacancies*
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Nevertheless, just as in the previous projection, the Bank
expects, the private sector as a whole to continue to face
excess capacities rather than tightness in 2003 and 2004.
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Data for the past few months indicate a reversal in 2003
Q2 in wage inflation from its downward trend in the
second half of 2002 and a flat level in early 2003, with
signs of a slow upturn in wages.20 While the interruption
in the decline in wage inflation followed by a slight
increase was noticeable in the area of market services
as early as the start of the year, second-quarter data for
manufacturing made it clear that, in contrast with the
Bank’s previous assessment, the downward trend in
wage inflation has also stopped in this sector.
The stronger-than-expected increase in manufacturing
wage inflation this year may be due to a combination
of factors. First, production, investment and invento-
ries data available for the second quarter, in line with
other labour market statistics, reflect an upturn in busi-
ness activity. The increase in production and sales rev-
enues caused by the pick-up in activity may stimulate
firms to loosen their wage policies. With regard to
market services, the persistently high level of domestic
demand was an additional factor in the further rise in
wage inflation.
An increase in inflation expectations may also explain the
slowdown in wage adjustment. The latest survey of
TÁRKI Social Research Centre shows that firms which
took their time in adjusting to the lower inflation envi-
ronment expect both wage growth and inflation to rise
faster both at end-2003 and early 2004.21
Clearly, wage inflation did not decline at the expected
pace, i.e. firms adjusted nominal wages to the lower
inflation environment more slowly than expected. The
Bank’s previous wage projection was based on the eco-
nomic theory assumption that with disinflation and eco-
nomic growth progressing much slower than wage
growth, the upsurge in labour costs marred corporate
competitiveness, which in turn would significantly
dampen firms’ intentions to raise wages.
On the basis of economic theory and assuming enter-
prises have rational wage policies, the Bank still expects
adjustments in wages to productivity growth. The latest
data reported only caused the Bank to revise the pro-
jected rate of this adjustment. It is assumed that firms
will adjust their wage setting policy to productivity
growth arising from economic recovery and deprecia-
tion of the forint exchange rate and to the increase in
net inflation as slowly and with as little flexibility as dur-
ing the previous disinflationary period. Accordingly, fol-
lowing an initially flat period in wage inflation and the
current slight rise, companies that suffered a loss in
competitiveness in the past will ‘rectify’, in other words
further reduce the rate of wage growth, despite rising
inflation. This will enable them to take advantage of
higher inflation and boost competitiveness.
The proposed cut in public sector wage increases based
on the budgetary proposals may also dampen private
sector wage growth. The demonstration effect of excep-
tionally high historical wage increases seen in this sec-
tor is likely to moderate considerably in the forthcoming
Firms' perception and expectation of wage
growth (TÁRKI survey)
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
Chart 3-7
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3.3 WAGE INFLATION
20 Actual data reported by the CSO available up to May; June data are estimated using statistical methods.
21 TÁRKI Social Research Centre’s survey of inflation expectations, July 2002.
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period. Based on empirical research findings, the Bank
believes that the government’s more subdued wage
policy may feed through to the private sector, possibly
only from 2004.22
In addition to the noted effects, the Bank has also con-
sidered the effects on wage inflation of the announced
fiscal tightening for 2004. The fiscal consolidation
announced by the Government in July will lead to a
sharp fall in household consumption, restricting growth
in market services and, consequently, wage inflation
within the sector. On the other hand, the projection has
not taken account of the second order inflationary pres-
sure caused by the proposed 2004 rise in indirect taxes
via raising inflation expectations and potentially the rate
of wage growth. This constitutes an upside risk to the
projection for wage inflation.
Taking into account all these effects, the wage projec-
tion for 2003 has been revised up from 8.8% in the pre-
vious Report to 9.3%, and from 6.5% to 8.1% in 2004,
still based on the decline in actual quarter-on-quarter
wage growth rates. The current exceptionally high
uncertainty surrounding developments in the labour
market has considerably widened the margin of error
around the projection. The risk to wage growth is clear-
ly on the upside both in 2003 and 2004. The possible
further slowdown in firms’ adjustment to inflation con-
stitutes an upside risk. More upward pressure on wage
inflation would be felt if the rise in indirect taxes led to
a further increase in firms’ inflation expectations. On the
other hand, a downside risk to the central projection for
wage inflation is a significant rise in unemployment.
Wage inflation projection*
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter indices)
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22 Palócz, É.–Tóth, I. J.: A 2002. évi bérnövekedés összetevôi és a 2003-ban várható béremelések egy vállalati felmérés tükrében [Components of wage
growth in 2002 and proposed wage increases in 2003 in the light of a company survey], Kopint-Datorg Rt. – MKIK GVI, Budapest, February 2003 (see
http://www.gvi.hu/).
23 Here it should be emphasised that this statement regards profitability considering only one factor of production, namely labour. As the Bank has no
clear view on how changes in other cost elements (an increase in regulated prices inflation) would alter the profitability of the corporate sector in 2004,
no statements on the future evolution of overall corporate profitability are made.
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In 2003 Q1, the growth rate of unit labour costs with-
in the private sector continued to decline as expect-
ed. This was because while labour costs rose at the
previous rate, productivity improved substantially,
especially in manufacturing.
The Bank expects the growth rate of unit labour costs
to decline gradually in the future, due to slower wage
inflation and higher productivity. The projection for
unit labour cost growth in the private sector is 5.1% in
2003 and 3.9% in 2004. As the inflation projection for
the forthcoming period exceeds the current projection,
the labour side profitability of companies is expected
to improve at a steady pace both in 2003 and 2004.23
As a result of the weakening of the nominal exchange
rate in June, the manufacturing real exchange rate
depreciated as a one-off but substantial change. With
the technical assumption that the July exchange rate
of the forint remains stable, manufacturing compa-
nies’ competitiveness based on unit labour costs will
improve by approximately 7% in 2003, in terms of a
one-off change, and remain unchanged in 2004.
Because of the acceleration of inflation, price-based
competitiveness only improves by 2% this year and
deteriorates by roughly 5% in 2004.
In recent years, growth in real wages has substantially
exceeded productivity growth both in manufacturing
and market services. As a consequence, firms’ labour-
side competitiveness has been on a steady decline
ever since early 2001, which prompted the Bank to
project increased corporate efforts to make adjust-
ments in the labour market. The reference period,
however, witnessed only a slow labour market adjust-
ment, implemented by the theoretically more costly
reduction in employment rather than by curbing wage
inflation.
The need to adjust varied in size across the sectors. Due
to the direct impact of developments in external
demand, manufacturing companies were forced to
make stronger adjustments than firms engaged in the
area of market services, supported by robust domestic
demand. As manufacturing companies responded
quickly to the reduced production by cutting employ-
ment, there was no decline in their productivity during
the crisis. Indeed, they have been able to report annual
productivity growth of 2.5% every year since early
2002. However, nominal wages were first brought in
line with disinflation as late as the second half of 2002,
when there was a major slowdown in the growth of real
wages in manufacturing, dropping nearly to the rate of
productivity growth. Even though the adjustment of
nominal wages came to a halt in 2003 Q1 (see Section
on Wages), firms’ labour-side profitability stopped dete-
riorating as rapidly as before, thanks to a further pick-up
in manufacturing productivity.
3.4 UNIT LABOUR COSTS AND COMPETITIVENESS
Productivity, wages and profits 
in manufacturing*
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
Chart 3-9
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* Changes in profits are approximated using the inverse of real ULCs
(see May Report). In fact, the category included in the chart denotes
a term whose meaning is narrower than that of the rate of profit, for
it does not comprise cost elements other than labour. Data on the
actual developments of the first three months of 2003 are only avail-
able for two months. Data on the remaining one month have been
estimated using statistical methods.
Due to the effect of the June 2003 shift in the exchange
rate band and the June depreciation of the forint, there
was significant one-off, temporary depreciation in the
ULC-based real exchange rate in manufacturing in 2003
Q2. (Assuming that the nominal exchange rate ruling
in July remains stable, the ULC-based real exchange
rate will depreciate by approximately 7% this year.)
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Output growth in the area of market services has been
balanced over the past few years, thanks to robust
domestic demand. Indeed, this sector managed to
record similar growth in productivity to manufacturing,
despite a steady rise in numbers employed. As increas-
es in the minimum wage impeded the adjustment of
nominal wages to disinflation, profitability in market
services was not able to improve considerably in the ref-
erence period, despite buoyant activity.
The Bank expects the growth rate of domestic unit labour
costs to decline steadily in the future. This will be partly
due to faster growth in productivity and partly to declin-
ing wage inflation. Improvement in manufacturing pro-
ductivity may be fostered by stronger economic activity,
while the Bank expects market services employment to
grow at a considerably slower pace. Hence, the Bank’s
projection for private sector productivity growth is 3.2%
in 2003 and 3.8% in 2004. The Bank also expects wage
inflation to lose momentum over the forecast horizon (see
Section on Wages), leading to a drop in unit labour cost
growth to 3.9% in 2004.
Productivity, wages and profits 
in market services*
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
Chart 3-10
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Productivity, wages and unit labour costs in the
private sector
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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Price-based real effective exchange 
rate indicators*
Chart 3-13
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Expecting Hungarian unit labour costs to increase at the
same pace as those abroad, the Bank uses a constant
assumption for the real exchange rate in 2004.
The picture is less rosy with regard to price-based com-
petitiveness, due to direct inflationary pressure, with a
projected improvement of roughly 2% in 2003 and 5%
deterioration in 2004. Thus, the projection is based on
the assumption that the shift in the exchange rate band
will only improve domestic competitiveness in the short
term and to a limited extent.

4 MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS
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In small economies with open capital markets, develop-
ments and expectations in international markets have a
major impact on investor behaviour and capital flows,
by influencing the risk appetite and returns on alterna-
tive investments. Monetary policy makers should take
account of the fact that global money market trends
equally affect the forint exchange rate and yields on
domestic investments. This is why every Report gives a
summary of the changes that have occurred over the
recent months or are expected in the near term in the
external environment (with particular regard to euro
yields) and investor sentiment. It is especially important
to carry out a thorough analysis of the international
environment in the current situation when Hungary is
much more dependant on funds from foreign financial
investors, due to the domestic saving positions seen in
2003.
The Federal Reserve’s rate reduction in June brought
the key monetary policy rate in the US economy to
another historical low of 1%. There are a number of fac-
tors which may stimulate a pick-up in economic growth
in the US economy from 2003 Q2, including the 9%
weakening of the US dollar seen this year, calculated
using trade weights, the decline in long yields and the
recovery on the equity markets. Despite these favourable
developments, there is significant risk to growth. Therefore,
based on the Federal Reserve’s latest statements, market
participants expect the level of interest rates to remain
low over the longer term.
Compared with the 25 basis point reduction in the
Federal Reserve’s key rate, the ECB lowered its key rate
by 50 basis points early in the summer. However, the
ECB was in a different position from the Federal
Reserve, due to a major strengthening of the euro
against the US dollar in spring. The disinflationary pres-
sure of the strong euro allowed the ECB to cut the key
rate by half a percentage point in June without causing
an increase in the medium-term risk to inflation. This,
however, did not lead to an easing of monetary condi-
tions within the euro area, as the effect of the interest
rate cut was offset by the stronger exchange rate. A sign
of rising tensions about European prospects was the
German Chancellor’s public statement for the ECB to
create a weaker euro exchange rate. Based on informa-
tion provided by the yield curve, market participants on
the whole do not expect the ECB to make further rate
cuts over the remainder of the year.
4.1. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Key Federal Reserve and ECB interest rates and
the US dollar/euro exchange rate
Chart 4-1
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The EMBI index, calculated from spreads on emerging
country dollar-denominated bonds, which measures
investors’ risk appetite, has remained virtually unchanged
in the past three months at an exceptionally low level
relative to previous years. In international markets, there
is a clear relationship between the level of yields seen
in advanced economies and risk premia. When US dol-
lar and euro yields are low, investors tend to be more
interested in higher-yielding, and necessarily riskier,
investments, which exerts downward pressure on the
risk premia. In addition to the market of developing
country sovereign bonds, this trend was also observable
in the market of higher-risk corporate bonds, both in
European and American markets. The short-term out-
look for risk premia is currently determined by expecta-
tions of a recovery in the advanced countries, the USA
in particular. If US dollar and euro long yields start to
rise rapidly, it is likely that investor preferences will
change and they will refuse to hold higher-risk instru-
ments unless they can expect a higher difference in
yields. In other words, measures of risk appetite are like-
ly to increase. 
Another piece of news reflecting on the perception of
the Central European region is Standard&Poor's nega-
tive outlook in June on the creditworthiness of Poland.
In a similar move, Fitch credit rating agency put a nega-
tive outlook on Hungarian debt in mid-July. The first
reactions to these decisions do not show an increase
in the market premia on sovereign debt. It is of key
importance with regard to the international perception
of Hungary that the economic policy decisions of the
past few weeks have not caused any major change in
sentiment about euro-denominated sovereign debt,
with a slight drop in the roughly 40 basis point premi-
um seen during the first few months of the year.
Spread on Hungary’s euro-denominated 
sovereign bonds
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The reference period was characterised by unusually
high volatility in the exchange rate of the forint and per-
sistent weakness not experienced since the exchange
rate band was widened in May 2001. Short yields were
primarily governed by expectations about central bank
measures which market participants expected in
response to the weakening of the exchange rate.
Market participants’ uncertainty increased steadily, con-
siderably raising the risk premium required on forint
investments. This rise in the risk premium could be fully
attributed to country-specific factors, as there was no
deterioration in international risk perception during the
period under review. Nevertheless, the reasons for the
weakening of the exchange rate date back to the peri-
od before May. Investment bank analysts have been
concerned about the upward trend in the current
account and budget deficits ever since the beginning of
the year.
Investors’ risk perception grew further when the MNB
announced on 26 May that the period of consolidation
after the speculative attack had ended. On 29 May, the
exchange rate of the forint weakened by 2%, followed
by further depreciation a few weeks later, bringing it to
the level of 255. Implied volatilities expressing foreign
exchange market option prices rose sharply, reflecting
the market’s increased uncertainty in exchange rate
expectations.
In terms of an agreement between the Government and
the MNB on 4 June, the latter gave its approval for the
devaluation of the central parity of the forint by 2.26%,
with the width of the exchange rate band remaining
unchanged. This moved the strong edge of the band to
EUR/HUF 240 from EUR/HUF 234.7, which while not
restricting monetary policy would, in the view of the
Government, help to avoid any potential overshoot of
the exchange rate that could jeopardise Hungarian
exporters’ competitiveness. At the same time, the
Government undertook the commitment to implement
the fiscal path set out in the Pre-Accession Programme
and to a rapid entry into ERM II. This intention was also
confirmed by an immediate fiscal adjustment.
Key policy rate and the three-month 
reference yield
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4.2 SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES AND EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS
In the period from 16 January and 21 February 2003, the overnight
deposit facility replaced two-week deposits as the key de facto policy
instrument due to a quantity restriction in effect, as the former had a
larger interest rate cut than the latter. As a result, three-month bench-
mark yields declined at a rate exceeding the rate on two-week
deposits. This period is denoted in the chart by an interruption in the
series for three-month yields.
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In response to the shift in the exchange rate band, the
forint continued to weaken relative to the euro. It weak-
ened from EUR/HUF 257 at the start of the day by 4%
to about EUR/HUF 268, followed by a slight correction.
Market participants viewed this move as a deliberate
weakening of the exchange rate, which they considered
to be inconsistent with the Bank’s former policy and
objectives. This interpretation of events might well be
explained by EU Monetary Affairs Commissioner Pedro
Solbes’s statement on 20 May, saying that, upon EMU
accession, the exchange rate stability criterion will be
assessed using a ±2.25 per cent band. In light of that
statement, market players might have thought policy
makers wanted the centre of the ERM II exchange rate
band to be around 282 HUF/EUR. Yet, such a view is
mistaken because this level is compatible neither with
the present nor the future anti-inflation efforts of the
MNB.
Indeed, on 5 June, one euro traded for as much as 270
forints in the interbank market, when senior officials of the
MNB and the Ministry of Finance issued a statement say-
ing that they would welcome a stronger exchange rate.
This instance of verbal intervention caused the exchange
rate to stabilise in the range between EUR/HUF 260 and
265, still weaker than the EUR/HUF 250 or 250–260
noted in the statement as the preferred range.
The Bank moved to increase rates twice in the course
of June, raising the key policy rate by 300 basis points,
in response to the persistently weak exchange rate. As
the second, 200 basis point rise on 19 June exceeded
expectations by roughly 100 basis points, initially mar-
ket participants expected a rapid reduction (within one
or two months). In view of the fact that the interest rate
rises caused the exchange rate to return to its former
stronger state only temporarily, the current level is
viewed by the market as more likely to be permanent.
Due to the ECB’s interest rate cut of 0.5 percentage
point in June, the MNB’s key policy instrument offers a
7.5% higher yield, up by 3.5% on April, than the ECB’s
key instrument. Due to the rise in short forint yields, the
real yield earned on one-year discount treasury bills
increased by over 2 percentage points relative to April.
The July rate of 4.1% slightly exceeds the average rate
(3.6%) for the years 2000 to 2002.
The changes in the interest rate have only stabilised the
forint, and permanent and significant strengthening is
something yet to come. In the final week of June and in
the middle of July, following temporary strengthening,
the exchange rate was again at a level weaker than
EUR/HUF 265. This weakening started in the wake of
the unfavourable decision of the Fitch rating agency on
the outlook for Hungarian government debt. The forint
further deteriorated following the joint press conference
of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and the
President of the MNB on 16 July, when the
Government made an announcement about the pro-
posed schedule of fiscal consolidation and their com-
mitment to adopting the euro in Hungary in 2008 and
entering ERM II in 2004. Short yields also moved in con-
junction with the exchange rate, with the market pricing
higher interest rates when the exchange rate weakened
and lower when it strengthened.
There was also a sharp drop in exchange rate uncertain-
ty, reflected in exchange market option prices in the first
half of July (as the exchange rate strengthened), but the
new wave of weakness triggered an increase in implied
volatilities. This has brought the twelve-month implied
volatility to its highest level this year, implying major
uncertainty also on the longer (one year) horizons. 
One-year real interest rates
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Reuters survey of macroanalysts also reflects greater
uncertainty in exchange rate expectations, that is a more
unpredictable environment. The May, June and July sur-
veys showed not only a shift towards steadily weaker
expected exchange rate appreciation but also an increase
in the spread of expectations. Although this does not nec-
essarily mean that analysts are uncertain about the future
course of the exchange rate, this seems to be the case.
In addition to market participants’ view of Hungarian
economic policy as being unpredictable, another key fac-
tor behind the movements in and spread of exchange
rate expectations may be Hungary’s imminent entry into
ERM II, which is also called the ‘waiting room’ for
Economic and Monetary Union. This is because entry will
entail a change in the monetary regime, in other words,
setting (multi-laterally) a new central parity. Experience of
earlier entrants suggests that this central parity cannot be
far removed from the prevailing market rate.
Macroanalysts vary widely in their opinion. Some ana-
lysts said they would expect the central parity to be in
the range of EUR/HUF 250–260, while others seem to
believe that the current band would continue under
ERM II. A factor that may ease the uncertainty is that the
Government and the Bank declared a commitment to
enter at an equilibrium rate which takes account of both
disinflationary and competitiveness objectives.
Average value and spread of exchange rate
expectations of Reuters analysts in 2003
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Developments in capital flows in April and May 2003
are governed by opposing trends. Just as in the first
quarter, the current account deficit is far in excess of
that for 2002. Direct capital investment continues to
play a negligible role in financing the current account
deficit. Indeed, just as in 2003 Q1, the month of May
witnessed a net outflow, as a result of the negligible
level of direct investment in Hungary and capital good
exports by Hungarian firms.
In the period from May to July 2003, there were some
relatively erratic changes in the stock of government
securities held by non-residents, increasing approxi-
mately by HUF 150 billion in the period as a whole.
4.3 CAPITAL FLOWS
Components of foreign exchange market demand and supply (HUF billions)*
2002 2003
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 April May
I. Current Account –117 –176 –70 –306 –207 –145 –75
II. Capital Account 13 15 6 13 –25 0 0
III. Direct investment (excluding revenues from privatisation) 27 80 19 28 –164 15 –20
IV. Demand for forints arising from conversion of domestic 
foreign currency deposits 60 –62 26 –40 87 –27 –35
1. Firms 25 –70 13 –41 62 –28 –24
2. Households 35 8 13 0 24 1 –11
V. Net portfolio investments  (1+2+3) 217 11 113 350 295 21 162
1. Government securities 144 33 236 310 177 38 163
2. Equities 14 –16 –25 –36 48 6 3
3. Forint deposits 59 –7 –98 76 70 –24 –4
VI. Corporate foreign currency credit (1+2) –230 –182 –167 –79 19 27 –19
1. Domestic 45 55 70 –23 95 4 13
2. Foreign –275 –237 –237 –56 –75 23 –31
VII. Net forint demand of other credit institutions 26 119 114 138 45 19 26
VIII. Other 11 125 28 152 92 51 115
IX. Net demand for forints of participants outside the banking 
sector (I. + II. + … + VIII.) 7 –70 68 256 142 –39 155
X. Change in banks’ on-balance-sheet long forint positions –7 70 –68 –256 371 –49 –274
XI. Net central bank intervention (IX. + X.) 0 0 0 0 513 –88 –119
Table 4-1
* Positive values denote forint demand and negative values denote forint supply.
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Following rapid rises in May, non-resident holdings fell
by nearly HUF 100 billion in June, with the majority of
sales occurring in the five days following the shift in the
exchange rate band. However, investors resumed buy-
ing large amounts of government securities in July,
bringing their end-of-month total holdings (HUF 2,160
billion) nearly up to the level seen at end-May.
In addition to the government securities holdings, it
seems worthwhile to take a look at non-resident deriva-
tives positions, with special regard to swaps, which
greatly influence the assessment of changes in non-resi-
dents’ forint positions. Swap transactions may cover var-
ious investor strategies. They may partly reflect specula-
tive synthetic positions against the forint, such as short
futures, and partly positions opened by non-resident
holders of government securities in order to hedge
against exchange rate risk. Even though these two
investor strategies cannot be separated, in respect of
demand and supply created in the foreign exchange
market they are identical.
Simultaneously with the rise in government securities
holdings seen prior to May, swaps also increased, reflect-
ing non-resident intentions to finance bond purchases
with swaps. This means that they did not wish to open
exchange rate positions. From end-May, when the
exchange rate began weakening, swaps started to
increase faster than government securities, possibly
reflecting further efforts to hedge existing holdings and
build speculative positions against the forint. Following
the band shift and simultaneously with a drop in the stock
of government securities, the amount of swaps increased,
which may indicate that due to increased uncertainty
about the exchange rate and the fact that large-scale sales
of government securities trigger major price changes,
some of the investors decided to use swaps to hedge
against exchange rate risk rather than sell.
In the period from May to July, non-resident swap hold-
ings increased by over HUF 500 billion, which implies
that non-resident investors’ exchange rate exposure had
fallen sharply during the past three months, despite the
increase in government securities. 
Government securities held by non-residents
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In the period from May to beginning of August 2003,
there was an upsurge in yields on maturities of over one
year. The rise in yields appeared to be strongest in the
section with shorter maturities. Benchmark yields on
government securities maturing in one to three years
increased by 200–260 basis points and those on 5–10
year government securities by 100–170 basis points in
the reference period. This caused a major shift in the
shape of the yield curve, with its virtually horizontal
shape seen in the first six months assuming a strong
negative slope as in previous years, with the differential
between one-year and ten-year benchmark yields rising
to over 200 basis points.
The yield changes are primarily due to the country-spe-
cific developments described in the previous sub-sec-
tion and, to a lesser extent, to changes in euro yields.
Changes in the global risk appetite only had a negligible
impact on the yield curve in the reviewed quarter. 
Yields on securities across maturities over one year fol-
lowed the decline in euro yields until end- May.
However, at end-May yields started to move in strong
correlation with the exchange rate of the forint. In the
majority of cases, the rise in yields was accompanied by
a weakening in the exchange rate. This indicates that
changes in yields are predominantly governed by
changes in the exchange rate risk premium required by
non-resident investors and/or changes in depreciation
4.4 LONG-TERM YIELDS AND INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
Benchmark yields in the government 
securities market
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expectations. These two factors are difficult to distin-
guish between on the basis of the information available.
The Reuters survey reveals that simultaneously with the
shift in the level of exchange rate expectations, they
continued to follow an appreciating trend. This implies
that the increase in uncertainty was the decisive factor
in the rise in required yields, in addition to a rise in euro
long yields first seen in mid-June. It should be noted that
in addition to the higher volatility in the exchange rate,
yields have also started to fluctuate considerably in the
past few months, which clearly reflects widespread
uncertainty. 
However, events also influencing the exchange rate
affected expectations differently over the individual
time horizons. Information on expectations relating to
longer-term interest rates and interest rate conver-
gence is available in the form of the course of
forint/euro implied forward differential. This suggests
that the increase in yields is primarily due to a shift in
expectations for terms shorter than five years, while
the implied forward differential remained on the
whole stable on longer-than-five year horizons.
Changes in implied forward differentials starting at
fixed dates are a good source of information on
expectations relating to the date of joining the euro.
The one-year forward differential starting in 2010
remained roughly the same at end-July as it was in
early May, which implies that there was no deteriora-
tion in long-term expectations despite the uncertainty
prevalent on the money markets. Apart from a tem-
porary rise in the aftermath of the shift in the
exchange rate band, the yield differential relating to
2008 did not rise either until mid-July. However, on
the days following the announcement of the
timetable for EMU entry and next year’s budgetary
proposals on 16 July, it rose by approximately 45
basis points, reflecting increased uncertainty about
the proposed date of entry in 2008. It should be
noted that the level of the yield differential starting in
2008, approximately 200 basis points, appears to be
exceptionally high in the context of the past 18
months, exceeding the typical value for end-2002 by
nearly 100 basis points at the beginning of August. 
The Reuters survey is another source of information on
developments in expectations relating to the adoption
of the euro. The results of the survey for the period until
mid-July show no significant change in the expected
date of EMU entry, with 2008–2009 remaining the pro-
jected date, which is, however, nearly a year later than
the expectation in January. The expectations reflected
in the changes in forward differentials coincide with the
results of the Reuters survey, as the yield differential
relating to 2008 did not start to rise before the second
half of July. 
Five-year forint and euro benchmark yields
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In connection with the Reuters survey it should be
noted that, compared with the number of those
responding to the rest of the questions in the poll, sig-
nificantly fewer, only 6 to 8, mainly Hungarian, macro-
analysts responded to the question about the date of
adopting the euro. 
The Reuters survey also provides information on devel-
opments in inflation expectations. Macroanalyst expec-
tations for December 2003 remained on the whole
unchanged since the April survey, with the average of
the forecasts being 5% in end-July.24
By contrast, the inflation expected by analysts in end-
July for the end of next year rose slightly by 60 basis
point to 4.7% in December 2004. The increase took
place mainly in the second half of July, reflecting the
potential impacts of the 16 July announcement of
changes in taxation and the budgetary proposals. All in
all, the impact of the developments since the May sur-
vey, in particular the weakening of the exchange rate
and changes in taxation, on the rate of inflation expect-
ed at end-2004, remained relatively moderate.
Distribution of most likely dates of EMU entry 
(A Reuters survey)
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24 Reuters conducted an ad hoc survey in end-July, with the aim of capturing the impact of the 16 July announcements on the forecasts of the main
macroeconomic variables.
* The path of forecasted inflation was obtained by fitting the smoothest
curve consistent with Reuters consensus (end year, average, next month).
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The recently disclosed budgetary proposals call for sub-
stantial changes in indirect taxation as of 1 January
2004.25 The standard 25% VAT rate is to be reduced to
23%, whereas reduced 12% and 0% rates are to rise to
15% and 5%, respectively. Concurrently, purchased heat
and electricity as well as passenger transport, hitherto
charged at reduced VAT rates, will be reclassified under
standard ones. Books, hitherto under a reduced VAT
rate, will be charged the lowest rate. Higher excise duty
on goods damaging health and the environment will
have to offset the loss in budgetary revenues caused by
the reduction in the VAT rates they have been under.26
Since the introduction of the inflation-targeting regime in
Hungary, changes in indirect taxation have never reached
the scope that the ones outlined in the budgetary pro-
posals for 2004. Changes of such significance are likely to
produce a one-off instance of considerable upwards pres-
sure on prices. As the Government’s tax measures are not
based on demand and supply in the economy, they
obscure general developments in inflation. Therefore, for
the purposes of analyses and in order to facilitate mone-
tary policy decision-making, it is expedient to calculate an
indicator of inflation which filters out the one-off effect of
changes in indirect taxation from the CPI.
Inflation could be calculated for a scenario where the
proposed changes in indirect taxation do not materi-
alise at all. The indices thus calculated could be directly
compared with the Bank’s projections in the Report in
May. If this approach were adopted, i.e. the proposed
changes in indirect taxation were ignored, the Bank’s
projection in August for inflation in December 2004
would be 4.4%. This index exceeds the one projected
in May by 0.5 percentage point. The difference can be
attributed mainly to a weaker forint exchange rate and
a higher wage inflation projection.
At the same time, however, changes in indirect taxation
may also affect corporate profit rates. In some sectors, it
may prove difficult to pass on the increase in indirect
taxes to customers in full. In other words: a decrease in
net sale prices may be able to provide for the possibility
of a more modest increase in gross prices than what
would be justified by changes in taxation. In other sec-
tors, however, the lowering of indirect taxes may boost
profitability through raising net prices. Thus, in addition to
a one-off instance of exerting upwards pressure on
prices, changes in indirect taxation may have a few indi-
rect effects, which depend on economic agents’ expec-
tations as well as developments in demand and supply.
Nevertheless, the corporate sector’s decisions on net
prices constitute parts of general developments in infla-
tion. Therefore, it stands to reason that a net inflation indi-
cator should be calculated for purposes of analyses that
is free of the direct effects of changes in indirect taxation,
but allows for the direct effects originating from eco-
nomic agents’ responses to the measures.27 As a result,
the Bank’s projected inflation for December 2004 is
4.8%. What follows provides a detailed discussion of this
projection. 
However, before direct and indirect effects are quanti-
fied, and so that such quantification can be substantiat-
ed, a brief summary of relevant economic hypotheses
and a few international examples are presented.
General theoretical approach
Let us take a simple, static and stylised macro-model as
our basis. If the goods market balance is calculated on
the basis of gross prices, any change in VAT rates will
cause a shift to the left in the (domestic) supply curve,
i.e. the same gross prices can buy fewer (domestic)
goods.28 As a result, gross prices rise while net prices
5.1 HOW ARE THE ANNOUNCED CHANGES IN INDIRECT TAXES LIKELY TO
AFFECT INFLATION?
25 The exact title of the document about budgetary proposals in 2004 published on the website of the Ministry of Finance: “Some details of the revenue
and expenditure side of the budget in 2004”, see http://www.p-m.hu/enghome.htm.
26 This analysis covers the changes in indirect taxation brought about by changes in VAT rates, the reclassification of certain goods subject to different
VAT rates and excised duties increases intended to offset the lowering of standard VAT rates. Changes in the price level produced by the lowering of
excise duty on gasoline and the raising of same on tobacco have been included in the basic projection.
27 For an example of a net inflation index, see the British RPIY index.
28 Microeconomic textbooks usually present the effects of VAT-changes graph net prices on the vertical axis. In that case, if there is an increase in the
VAT-rate it is not the supply, but the demand schedule shifts leftwards. However, the transmission effects are the same in both cases. See. e.g. Mas-
Colell, A., Whinston, M. D. and Green, J. R., “Microeconomic Theory”, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 323–324.
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fall. The quantity sold (Y) also declines. The initial extent
of price changes depends on the price elasticity of the
supply and demand curves.
This also affects the labour market. If labour supply is
inelastic in the short run, any change in VAT rates, hav-
ing raised the gross price level, will lower labour demand.
Real wages calculated on the basis of a given gross price
reduce labour demand (the value of the marginal prod-
uct of labour). Nominal wages grow less than gross
prices.
Labour market implications reduce real wages, with
labour use and output remaining unchanged. As domes-
tic consumption declines, the trade balance should
improve.
In the capital market a shift to the left in the goods market
supply curve also generates a shift to the left in capital
demand. Given a small open economy, the capital supply
curve is completely flat. As in the labour market, in the
capital market, too, there is a shift in the capital demand
curve, inducing a dip in the capital stock. However, as the
user cost of capital is determined abroad, it remains unal-
tered. As changes in the capital stock are insignificant,
aggregate effects are negligible.
Falling real wages (as well as slightly declining capital
demand), on the other hand, lower aggregate income,
which, in turn, causes a shift to the left in the goods mar-
ket demand curve. This somewhat slows the initial
growth rate of gross prices. As a result, the economy
passes from a goods market balance denoted by point
E to an equilibrium denoted by point E’.
In sum, there is a shift to the left in the aggregate sup-
ply and aggregate demand curves, with gross prices on
the rise and domestic consumption on the decline. This
static model is, however, unable to handle an important
channel: in a dynamic model all this may affect inflation
and wage expectations. Nor can the emergence of a
wage-price spiral be ruled out.
International experience
International literature suggests that financial policy can
affect prices through four channels: government spend-
ing on goods and services, direct and indirect taxes and
higher fiscal tightening affecting the cost of labour.
Investigations involving quite a few models show that
changes in indirect taxation exert the most profound
impact on inflation.
Greece lowered indirect taxes in 1998 and 1999, generat-
ing an approximately 0.9-percentage point decline in
inflation in the euro area during the reference period
between April 1999 and March 2000. 
Impact of higher indirect taxes 
on the goods market*
Chart 5-1
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Impact of higher indirect taxes
on the labour market*
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Impact of higher indirect taxes 
on the capital market*
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The bulk of the increase in VAT rates (the reduced 10%
rate was raised to 14%) in Slovakia in January 2003 was
immediately reflected in consumer prices. By contrast, a
simultaneous lowering (the standard VAT rate was low-
ered from 23 to 20%) was not in reflected the first few
months. 
There was a 1.5-percentage point increase in VAT rates
in the Netherlands in 2001, producing a nearly 1-per-
centage point rise in consumer prices.
Quantification of the impact of the changes taking
effect in 2004 in Hungary
Direct effects
The direct effects of changes in indirect taxation are
denoted by the weighted average of changes in rates.
Based on this, the price level may rise by 1 percentage
point in the first months of 2004. 
The table below reveals that any rise in the VAT rates
charged on certain goods and services with regulated
prices alone will raise the CPI by over 0.8 percentage
point in 2004.
However, this sets a rigid lower threshold to the esti-
mates, as any modification in the system of VAT
rates leads to rises in the prices of goods with non-
regulated prices, on the whole. Given a symmetric
spillover representing the limit of economic rational-
ity, in the case of market-priced goods, a 1.6%
reduction in the prices of goods subject to standard
VAT rates (amounting to approximately 40% of CPI)
is offset by a 2.7% rise in reduced VAT rates (goods
amounting to approximately 25% of CPI). Finally, in
the case of reclassified goods, tax measures are like-
ly to increase consumer price level by nearly 0.15
percentage point.
Table 5-1
Impact of the changes in indirect taxes on goods and services with regulated prices on price levels (Per cent)*
Weight VAT rate Effect on price Weighted 
in the CPI** level effect on
2003 2004 price level***
Purchase of heat and electricity 4.7 12 23 9.8 0.46
Local transport excluding taxis 0.7 12 23 9.8 0.07
Travel to work, school 0.5 12 23 9.8 0.05
Other travel 0.5 12 23 9.8 0.05
Pharmaceutical products**** 2.1 0 5 5.0 0.10
Meals at schools, kindergartens and nurseries 0.6 12 15 2.7 0.02
Natural and manufactured gas 2.0 12 15 2.7 0.05
Regulated services for dwellings 2.3 12 15 2.7 0.06
Postal services 0.1 Free of tax 0.0 0.00
Lottery, football pools and other gambling 0.5 Free of tax 0.0 0.00
Rent 0.1 Free of tax 0.0 0.00
Telephone 2.5 25 23 –1.6 –0.04
Regulated goods and services total 16.6 0.83
* The range of goods with regulated prices included in this table is interpreted in a narrow sense, meaning that the CSO groups which include
both market-priced goods and goods with regulated prices have been de-aggregated. This accounts for the differences between the weight
of the MNB-defined group of goods with administered prices and that of the ‘total’ column in the above table.
** For the groups of goods (e.g. medicine, telephone rates and rents) which include both market-priced goods and goods with regulated prices,
expert projections of weight have been provided.
*** Figures may not add up due to rounding.
**** In the case of medicine, additional subsidy for certain drugs to offset increased VAT rates cannot be ruled out. However, for lack of detailed
data, such subsidy cannot be allowed for.
should be borne in mind: the intensity of market com-
petition, the price elasticity of demand and the trans-
parency of prices.
– Spillovers of changes in VAT rates to prices hinge pri-
marily on the intensity of competition on the market
of the goods and/or services in question. With intense
competition, a drop and a certain amount of rise (e.g.
in the case of durable goods) in VAT rates are reflect-
ed in prices.
– It is safe to assume that the prices of the goods (e.g.
telephone rates) which households can keep track of
easily and the net and gross prices of which goods
households are familiar with will be affected favourably
by any reduction in the highest VAT rates.
– In the case of certain sophisticated goods, the price
elasticity of demand is low, as it is hard for consumers
to identify the impact of quality. Tax increases are
reflected in the prices of such goods, whereas the
impact of tax reduction is restricted.
In respect of goods and services whose indirect taxes
will decline, the indirect effect is estimated to stand at
0.6 percentage point. This means that companies will
only build indirect tax cuts in their gross prices to a
small extent, which in turn means that net prices will
rise. By contrast, in the case of goods and services
whose indirect taxes will grow, net prices will fall by 0.2
percentage point, the reason for that being that tax
increase will only in part be passed on to consumers.
Overall, the indirect effects of changes in indirect taxa-
tion are likely to amount to 0.4 percentage point. This
means that net inflation will rise to the same extent rel-
ative to the scenario where the announced changes in
indirect taxation do not materialise at all.
Table 5-3
Estimates of the primary impact of changes in
indirect taxation on price level (Per cent)
Direct Indirect Overall 
impact impact impact 
Goods and 
services whose 
indirect taxes will fall –0.7 0.6 –0.1
Goods and services 
whose indirect 
taxes will rise 1.7 –0.2 1.5
Total 1.0 0.4 1.4
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Changes in effective VAT rates provide good approxi-
mation of the nearly 1 percentage point rise in prices
brought about by the direct effects of changes in indi-
rect taxation. ‘Effective VAT rates’ means the average
VAT burden on the consumer basket, which will rise by
nearly 1 percentage point to 19.7% from early 2004.29
Indirect effects
As was mentioned, changes in indirect taxation may
also affect corporate profit rates. Expert estimates in a
breakdown by types of goods have been provided to
assess the direction and extent of such indirect effects.
While providing such estimates, three major factors
29 In the case of certain items, effective VAT rates for 2004 also comprise rises in excise duties offsetting the lowering of VAT rates.
Estimated direct rises in price levels caused by
changes in indirect taxation (Per cent)
Weight in VAT rate VAT rate Change
CPI* in 2003 in 2004**
Goods and services 
reclassified under 
standard tax rate 8.0 12 23 9.8
Goods subject
to the lowest
tax rate*** 2.4 0 5 5.0
Goods and services 
subject to reduced 
tax rate 29.6 12 15 2.7
Goods and services 
subject to standard 
tax rate 41.6 25 23 –1.6
Goods and services 
reclassified under the 
lowest tax rate 0.6 12 5 –6.3
Goods and services 
whose indirect tax rate 
are unchanged**** 17.9 0.0
Total 100.0 18.7 19.7 0.9
* Figures may not add up due to rounding.
** In the case of certain items, it also comprise rises in excise
duties offsetting the lowering of VAT rates.
*** The budgetary proposals state that a certain portion of the price
rise originating from the VAT rate on medicine will be compen-
sated for by the budget. For lack of a detailed implementation
decree, however, a full direct impact of the rise in VAT rates has
been calculated.
**** Raised excise duty on goods damaging health and the environ-
ment offsets a reduction in their prices caused by increased
VAT rates.
Table 5-2
Direct and indirect effects considered, the proposed
changes in indirect taxation are likely to raise consumer
price level by 1.4 percentage points in January 2004.
Accordingly, the Bank’s projection for inflation at year-
end 2004 is 5.8%. Net inflation only comprising indirect
effects would rise to 4.8% by year-end 2004.
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Estimated rises in price levels caused by
changes in indirect taxation as per MNB 
grouping (Per cent)
Weight Effect on Weighted
price effect on
level price 
level*
Core inflation estimate 68.1 0.4 0.3
Unprocessed food 6.3 2.1 0.1
Market-priced energy 1.5 6.2 0.1
Motor fuel 4.7 -0.4 0.0
Regulated prices 19.4 4.6 0.9
CPI 100.0 1.4 1.4
* Figures may not add up due to rounding.
Table 5-4
Net inflation does not comprise, however, a potential
secondary effect, namely that economic agents’
expectations, too, may change and that wage adjust-
ment (higher inflation) to a higher price level may
commence. This potential secondary effect features
among the risks of the current inflation projection.
Impact of changes in indirect taxation 
on inflation projection for December 2004
Chart 5-4
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The purpose of making a projection is to determine
the impact of fiscal policy on the basis of specific
assumptions and within certain limits of probability.
Should these assumptions be highly uncertain, the pro-
jection will also be uncertain, and the risks involved
can only be defined within an excessively wide inter-
val. One source of great uncertainty is when there is
no approved Budget Act available, and the deficit
should be reduced while earlier decisions exert
upward pressure. In such a situation it seems useful to
present an extreme, risk-based scenario, showing the
size of the expected deficit if no changes were made
and only the effects of earlier decisions were applied.
The difference between this scenario and another,
more likely scenario would then reflect the assumed
impact of policy.
How is forecasting done?
There are basically three different types of fiscal fore-
casts: (1) rules-based forecasts, (2) “most likely” expert
forecasts and (3) conditional, “normative” forecasts.
Normative forecasting offers the least leeway for judge-
ment, as it means simply accepting that next year’s
deficit will equal the approved value. Regardless of this,
it is necessary to make estimates for off-budget items. In
contrast, the expert estimate gives ample scope for
judgement using a wide range of information. The fol-
lowing section gives a description of rules-based fore-
casting, which lies in between the two other types of
forecasts.
Rules-based forecasting may be based on various prin-
ciples. For the purpose of making risk-based forecasts
by taking account of pre-determined events, a number
of specific rules have to be applied. This means, fol-
lowing the international standards (e.g. OECD princi-
ples30), that in addition to the effects of automatic
budgetary measures (such as indexation), only the
effects of policy measures approved officially (e.g.
statutorily) and/or specified in detail should be consid-
ered. This will enable forecasters to show the size of
the full ‘fiscal risk’ uncovered by policy measures in
meeting a specific deficit target. In addition, via a com-
parison with a likely scenario it will also reveal how
much the likely policy measures may reduce the risk.
In addition to the effect of policy measures, it should
also be considered that the government cannot assert
full control in every area. Thus, for instance, local gov-
ernment authorities and, to a limited extent, budgetary
units may undershoot or overshoot the government’s
expenditure estimates. Furthermore, there exist some
open-ended subsidies that may be, and are indeed,
overshot every year depending on the number of users.
In the treatment of these items, we have not exclusive-
ly used government intentions as a starting point but
also our own estimates prepared on the basis of histor-
ical trends (see Autonomous fiscal developments).
The Bank also makes its own forecasts for revenues
from taxes and contributions and the indexation of pen-
sions, relying on its own macroeconomic projection.
The three factors necessarily correlate with one anoth-
er. The larger the extent of the approved policy, the
greater the chance that it will be partially offset by fiscal
developments (for instance, budgetary units will use
more carry-over funds, or local authorities will choose
to accumulate debt, etc.). Furthermore, policy measures
have both direct and indirect effects on macroeconomic
variables, such as wages, consumption and investment.
Extra spending, for instance, will also improve revenues
via causing an increase in taxes. This is why the August
2002 Report uses data on the expenditure set out in the
hundred-day programme in net terms, after deduction
of taxes. To the extent that the rules-based approach
does not consider an announced but not yet enacted
adjustment, its likely macroeconomic impact (higher
GDP, balance of payments deficit, etc.) is also ignored
in the Bank’s projections. In other words, the total pro-
jection will be conditional.
What does rules-based forecasting mean in practice?
Forecasting should start with a review of statutory and
other pre-determined measures for the following year.
Pre-determined measures comprise indexation of pen-
5.2 PRINCIPLES OF THE RULES-BASED FISCAL FORECAST
30 See http://www.oecd.org/document/40/0,2340,en_2649_34595_1850792_1_1_1_37443,00.html
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sions, the full-year effect of measures passed in the pre-
vious year (such as wage increases during the year, sur-
viving spouses pension, etc) and effects unfolding over
a longer period of time (e.g. the newly adopted corpo-
rate investment tax credit). Statutory measures include,
for instance, a pre-approved reduction in personal
income tax and the gradual adoption of 13th month pen-
sion payment. The greatest change is expected to be
brought by joining the EU. First, Hungary will be
required to make a contribution. Second, the Budget
will lose a major part of its revenues from customs
duties. On the other hand, Hungary will receive transfer
payments from the EU, which will have to be stated
automatically as expenditure, together with the co-
financing to be provided by the Budget. By contrast,
current agricultural subsidies from the EU will not be
provided through the Budget.
However, there are a number of areas which are not
affected by determined events or statutory decisions.
What approach should be used there?
– In respect of revenues, macroeconomic develop-
ments determining the tax base should be used as a
starting point when there are no measures. However,
as these developments are not independent of the
Bank’s fiscal forecasts, efforts should be made to
coordinate these forecasts through iterative steps.
– As far as current expenditure, in particular spending
on wages, goods and services, is concerned, it is jus-
tified to start from ‘common’ trends seen over previ-
ous years. These are expenses that arise continuously
in connection with specific tasks to be carried out,
and in this sense it can be ruled out that these items
would increase or decrease significantly without the
involvement of policy.
– As far as much more volatile investment spending is
concerned, the impact of the election cycle, especial-
ly with regard to local government, should also be
considered. The two years following the election wit-
nessed similarly low levels of investment spending,
while the next two years saw a pick-up in this area.
– It is difficult to forecast developments in the quasi-fis-
cal items that influence demand, as a large number of
them are linked to investment projects and corporate
losses. There seems to be some regularity in their fluc-
tuations. In some years they remain relatively stable,
but in a pre-election year they rise sharply. They take
low or negative values when the quasi-fiscal debt gen-
erated outside the Budget has to be accounted for
subsequently (e.g. in 2002) or when they can be
reduced by a better-than-approved official deficit (e.g.
in 2000), making some room of manoeuvre for the
following years.
78 MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
5 SPECIAL TOPICS
5
Potential output (potential GDP) and output gap are
important means of business cycle analyses in a great
number of countries. The evaluation of the cyclical posi-
tion of fiscal policy, the moves made by monetary policy
and inflationary pressure in the economy are often
analysed in the light of potential output and output gap.
Potential GDP reflects long-term trends in output. The dif-
ference between actual and potential GDP (output gap)
reveals whether the relevant economy is above or below
a longer-term growth path.31 Therefore, in the future, so as
to evaluate the business cycle, the Bank will also include
the study of the output gap as a means of analyses.
It is not so much the abundance of methods to assess
potential output as the selection of the appropriate
theoretical framework to investigate it that renders
the assessment of potential output difficult. It follows
that both the notion and the extent of the output gap
vary greatly. 
As potential output is a phenomenon that can be nei-
ther observed nor measured in reality, a great number
of assessment methods can be employed to estimate
it. For the purpose of convenience, let us assume that
approaches to assessing potential output fall into two
major categories: one is the category of mono-variable
time series approaches and the other is that of multi-
variable structural models. The potential application of
both methods is currently being investigated at the
Economics Department. The research of time series
approaches has been completed.32
As addressing the issue of structural breaks, common in
transition economies, is of critical importance when
potential output is assessed, expert opinions have been
invited and formal tests carried out to identify the break-
ing points in the time series of Hungarian GDP.
To assess the potential output, six different mono-variable
methods have been employed, from which a consensus-
based estimate has been deduced.33 In addition to the
application of standard econometric tests, while selecting
the various methods, we strove to minimise a feature of
estimates that was disadvantageous in terms of analysis,
i.e. the fact that each new item of information transforms
the past. This is the most conspicuous in the case of the
most recent observations, which form the basis of central
bank analyses and projections. It follows that the method
that has to be the least frequently revised represents the
greatest weight in consensus-based estimates.34
As the output gap thus calculated approximates the
result based on expert opinions and model simulations
very closely, it is used to assess the actual state of the
business cycle in the Bank’s current Report.
5.3 ESTIMATES OF THE OUTPUT GAP IN HUNGARY
31 Note, that output gap measures the ratio of the level of actual and potential GDP. Hence, at a certain time period the sign of the gap does not contain
the information on the difference between actual and potential growth rate. The latter can be calculated from the change in output gap.
32 A summary of time series methods is presented in ‘Assessing potential GDP with time series methods’, an MNB manuscript by Zs. Darvas and G. Vadas
(2003). For the purposes of the Quarterly Projection Model, based on ‘Assessing capital stocks in Hungary: methodology and results’, an MNB man-
uscript by G. Pula, potential GDP has also been assessed on the basis of the production function. Based on preliminary results, the results of time series
methods and estimates based on the production function are similar.
33 They include deterministic segmented trends, the Hodrich-Prescott and the band-pass filters, the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition, latent variable mod-
els and Wavelet transformation.
34 A similar consideration can be identified in Orhanides and Norden’s ‘The reliability of output gap estimates in real time’ published by the Federal
Reserve in 1999.
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The chart above reveals that at the start of the period
following the regime change, especially in 1991 and
1992, output gap was rather negative as a result of
the recession at that time. In both 1993 and 1994, the
performance of the economy exceeded potential out-
put, only to be followed by a nearly 1% negative out-
put gap in 1995 and 1996, for which the underlying
reason was the stabilisation package adopted in that
period. Following the introduction of this package of
adjustment measures in 1995, the economy remained
on a relatively even path until 2002, with a roughly zero
output gap.
It should be noted that this was brought about by two con-
flicting developments in 2001 and 2002: while external
demand, and consequently, exports and corporate invest-
ment considerably slowed, domestic demand (mainly due
to an increasingly expansionary fiscal policy and massive
wage increases) had an invigorating effect, offsetting the
former unfavourable development in terms of growth.
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